谢国忠: 泡沫破裂与否，高增长率都很可能继续

中国泡沫一旦破裂又会怎样？

中国股市目前的市盈率是50-60倍（我们真的不知道具体数字），住宅地产的售价是平均家庭收入的15到20倍。很多人把现在的中国与1989年的日本和1997年的香港相提并论。但这种比较是错误的。

中国的城市住宅地产以及在国内外股市上市的股票，是GDP的3.5倍。而日本和香港在泡沫破裂前达到的峰值为接近10倍。我不否认中国资产市场存在泡沫。多数人将泡沫的形成归咎于过剩的流动性。的确，中国2007年的经常账户盈余有可能达到GDP的10%。这么大一笔盈余现金可以促成泡沫。不过，政府对资产供应的控制，是造成这种荒谬估值的更重要原因。

例如，在上海、深圳和香港上市的中国公司的全部股票，现在的价值为35万亿元人民币（合 4.649万亿美元）到40万亿元人民币，相当于GDP的146%到167%。这些股票有三分之二以上由政府实体持有。本土上市公司的流通股仅价值区区9 万亿元人民币，相当于GDP的38%。中国股市与2000年的纳斯达克(Nasdaq)相似，当时，炙手可热的互联网公司估值达到荒谬的水平，而流通股却很少。

除了国有股缺乏流动性外，中国对首次公开发行和配股的严格控制也难辞其咎。私人所有的上市公司的控股股东不能减持股票，就算他们认为这些股票估值过高也不行。中国的政府政策刻意阻止这类有助于防止市场偏离基本面的套利行为。

住宅地产的价值是家庭持有股票价值的4至4.5倍。随着中国房地产建设投资达到GDP的10%，这成为一个存量和流量都很大的市场。中国的房价居高不下，是由于中国存在规模大得出奇的灰色收入——通过收取高于官定水平的价格而积累起来的收益。在房产的销售价值中，建设成本不足三分之一。其余一部分作为土地出售收益和税收进入地方政府，另一部分作为利润流入房地产开发商的腰包。这些资金往往在拥有灰色收入的人群中循环流动。房地产价格越高，灰色收入就越多。

重点行业的国有制也会产生大量灰色收入。在我询问一位二线城市的开发商时，他告诉我，他的大型开发项目的买家，多数是教师、医生、公务员和警察。家长付钱给教师，希望对自己的孩子予以额外照顾；医生在把你送上手术台前索要高价；而公务员和警察……

中国的房地产市场就像压在经济上的一个榨汁机——通过各种权力手段将全部汁液压榨出来，然后喷向房地产。权力的高货币价值和对房地产的热爱，两者的结合使中国房地产市场成为一个规模庞大、价格高昂的市场。不过，中国住宅地产的价值只有GDP的1.7倍。而日本1989年为4.5倍，香港1997年为7.5 倍。

中国资产泡沫的破裂可能发生在下周，也可能是在明年。在这方面，我和你一样不清楚。然而，泡沫破裂对经济的影响将是有限的。如果股市下跌一半，中国家庭会损失相当于GDP 20%的账面财富，与美国股市下跌15%对经济造成的影响差不多。如果房地产市场下跌30%，多数中国人都会发出笑声；只有富人和权势阶层会哀怨。中国的银行可能会受到不良贷款的困扰。但中国政府往往会在盛宴过后买单，而且还会马上再举办一场盛宴。它仍有钱这么做。

中国增长的动力是贸易和城市化。美国经济衰退可能会放缓中国贸易的增长。但中国与其它发展中国家的贸易正在繁荣发展。由于所有发展中国家都有过剩的外汇储备，即便美国经济低迷，它们也能继续花钱。推动城市化建设的是地方政府。新的党委书记刚刚上任，他们都热衷于推进城市化。中国将继续建设，直至资金枯竭。在可预见的未来，中国各银行的资金过剩。

无论泡沫破裂与否，中国的高增长率都很可能继续下去。

（谢国忠是驻上海的一位独立经济学家。何黎译）

来自谢国忠搜狐博客　http://xieguozhong.blog.sohu.com/

英文原文

CHINA'S BUBBLE MAY BURST BUT THE IMPACT WILL BE LIMITED

 
 
Andy Xie
Thursday, October 18, 2007
 
 
China's

stock market is trading at 50-60 times earnings – we really don't know the number – and its residential properties are selling for 15-20 times average household income. Many draw parallels between China now and Japan of 1989 or Hong Kong of 1997. The comparison is wrong.

China's urban residential properties and listed shares in the local and foreign stock market are worth 3.5 times GDP. Both Japan and Hong Kong peaked near 10 before bursting. I am not denying that China's asset market is a bubble. Most blame excess liquidity for the bubble. Yes, China's current account surplus is likely to reach 10 per cent of GDP in 2007. Such a large sum of surplus cash can cause a bubble. But, the government control of asset supply is more to blame for the ridiculous valuation.

For example, all the shares of Chinese companies listed in Shanghai, Shenzhen and Hong Kong are worth Rmb35,000bn ($4,649bn) to Rmb40,000bn, or 146 to 167 per cent of GDP. Over two-thirds of these are owned by government entities. The shares that are liquid and locally listed are merely Rmb9,000bn, or 38 per cent of GDP. China's stock market is similar to Nasdaq's in 2000 when the hot internet companies had ridiculous valuations but small free floats.

In addition to the illiquidity of state-owned shares, tight control over IPOs and share placements are also to blame. The controlling shareholders of privately owned and listed companies cannot sell down their shares even when they think the shares overvalued. Government policy in China deliberately blocks such arbitrages that prevent a market from running away from fundamentals.

The value of residential properties is 4-4.5 times that of the shares that households own. With investment in property construction reaching 10 per cent of GDP, it is a large market in stock and flow. Its high price is due to the presence of extraordinarily large grey income in China – earnings garnered by charging above official prices. Property construction costs less than a third of the sales value. The rest goes to local governments as land sale proceeds and taxes and to property developers as profits. That money tends to circulate among people who have grey income. The higher the property price, the more the grey income.

State ownership in important sectors also generates large grey income. One developer in a second-tier city, when I asked, told me that most buyers at his vast development were teachers, doctors, civil servants and policemen. Teachers get paid by the parents of their pupils for extra care. Doctors raise prices right before putting you on the operating table. Well, civil servants and policemen . . .

China's property market is like a squeegee machine on the economy – all its juice is sucked out through all the levers of power and squirted into property. The high monetary value of power and the love of property have combined to make China's property market large and expensive. Still, the value of China's residential properties is 1.7 times GDP. Japan's was 4.5 in 1989 and Hong Kong's 7.5 in 1997.

China's asset bubble may burst next week or next year. Your guess is as good as mine. The economic impact, however, will be limited. If the stock market drops by half, households lose 20 per cent of GDP in paper wealth, similar to the impact of a 15 per cent drop of the US market on its economy. If the property market drops 30 per cent, most people in China will laugh; only the rich and powerful will grumble. The banks may suffer bad debts. But the Chinese government has a tendency to pick up the tab after a party and gets another one going right afterwards. It still has the money to do so.

China's growth drivers are trade and urbanisation. A US recession could slow down the former. But China's trade with other developing countries is booming. As all developing countries have excess forex reserves, they can continue to spend in spite of a US downturn. Local governments drive urbanisation. They have just got their new party secretaries, who are eager to push ahead. China will continue to build until it runs out of money. The banks have too much money for the foreseeable future.

Burst or not, China's high growth is likely to continue.

Andy Xie is an independent economist in Shanghai