乔华莘(2015-02-19 23:15:13)
ISIS到底要什么?
原载美国《大西洋月刊》
作者： Graeme Wood 格雷米·伍德
The Islamic State is no mere collection of psychopaths. It is a religious group with carefully considered beliefs, among them that it is a key agent of the coming apocalypse. Here’s what that means for its strategy—and for how to stop it.
伊斯兰国并不仅仅是一群疯子聚在一起。它是一个宗教团体，有深思熟虑的信仰，其中之一就是认为自己是末日决战的关键力量。以下讨论其战略意图，以及阻止它的方法。
What is the Islamic State?
什么是伊斯兰国？
Where did it come from, and what are its intentions? The simplicity of these questions can be deceiving, and few Western leaders seem to know the answers. In December, The New York Times published confidential comments by Major General Michael K. Nagata, the Special Operations commander for the United States in the Middle East, admitting that he had hardly begun figuring out the Islamic State’s appeal. “We have not defeated the idea,” he said. “We do not even understand the idea.” In the past year, President Obama has referred to the Islamic State, variously, as “not Islamic” and as al-Qaeda’s “jayvee team,” statements that reflected confusion about the group, and may have contributed to significant strategic errors.
它来自何方？目的何在？这些问题看似简单，却容易让人误入歧途，而且似乎没几个西方领导人知道答案。12月，《纽约时报》公布了美国驻中东特别行动司令麦克·中田少将的一些言论，其中承认他也是才刚刚开始思考伊斯兰国的诉求。他说：“我们并没有击败他们的意识形态，甚至都不了解他们的意识形态。”过去几年，奥巴马总统在不同场合曾指伊斯兰国“不是伊斯兰”，只是基地组织的“初级预备队”。这种说法把对该组织的混乱认识表露无遗，而且可能已经导致重大的战略错误。
The group seized Mosul, Iraq, last June, and already rules an area larger than the United Kingdom. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has been its leader since May 2010, but until last summer, his most recent known appearance on film was a grainy mug shot from a stay in U.S. captivity at Camp Bucca during the occupation of Iraq. Then, on July 5 of last year, he stepped into the pulpit of the Great Mosque of al-Nuri in Mosul, to deliver a Ramadan sermon as the first caliph in generations—upgrading his resolution from grainy to high-definition, and his position from hunted guerrilla to commander of all Muslims. The inflow of jihadists that followed, from around the world, was unprecedented in its pace and volume, and is continuing.
去年6月，他们占领了伊拉克的摩苏尔，目前控制的地区比英国都大。阿布·巴克尔·巴格达迪从2010年5月起一直担任该组织的领袖，但他去年夏天以前的最新影像资料不过是美军占领伊拉克时被羁押在布卡集中营中的一段模模糊糊的视频而已。然后，到去年7月5日，他登上摩苏尔努里大清真寺的讲坛，以首任哈里发的身份进行斋月布道，影像质量一下子从模模糊糊飞跃到高清，身份也从被追捕的游击队员变成全体穆斯林的领袖。此后从全世界纷至沓来的圣战斗士从速度和规模上都前所未有，而且还在继续。
Our ignorance of the Islamic State is in some ways understandable: It is a hermit kingdom; few have gone there and returned. Baghdadi has spoken on camera only once. But his address, and the Islamic State’s countless other propaganda videos and encyclicals, are online, and the caliphate’s supporters have toiled mightily to make their project knowable. We can gather that their state rejects peace as a matter of principle; that it hungers for genocide; that its religious views make it constitutionally incapable of certain types of change, even if that change might ensure its survival; and that it considers itself a harbinger of—and headline player in—the imminent end of the world.
我们对于伊斯兰国的无知从某种程度上来说是有道理的。它是一个隐修士的王国，去往那里的人很少回来。巴格达迪也仅仅面对镜头演讲过一次。但他的演讲，以及伊斯兰国其他无数宣传影片和通告，都发布在网上。伊斯兰国的支持者坚持不懈地让世人明白他们的所作所为。我们从中可以了解，这个国家原则上拒绝和平，渴望种族屠杀，它的宗教观点使它从根本上无法进行某些变革，即使这种变革能确保其生存；它认为自己是即将到来的世界末日的预言者，而且也是首要参与者。
The Islamic State, also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), follows a distinctive variety of Islam whose beliefs about the path to the Day of Judgment matter to its strategy, and can help the West know its enemy and predict its behavior. Its rise to power is less like the triumph of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (a group whose leaders the Islamic State considers apostates) than like the realization of a dystopian alternate reality in which David Koresh or Jim Jones survived to wield absolute power over not just a few hundred people, but some 8 million.
伊斯兰国又称伊拉克及阿尔沙姆伊斯兰国（ISIS），它遵循的是一种独特的伊斯兰教派，它对通往最终审判之路的信念影响着它的战略，也可以帮助西方了解它的敌人，以及预测它的行为。它的崛起与埃及穆斯林兄弟会（伊斯兰国将穆兄会的领袖视为叛徒）的成功不同，而更像大卫·考雷什或吉姆·琼斯之类的反乌托邦主义再世，不过它以绝对权力统治的不是几百个人，而是八百万人。
We have misunderstood the nature of the Islamic State in at least two ways. First, we tend to see jihadism as monolithic, and to apply the logic of al‑Qaeda to an organization that has decisively eclipsed it. The Islamic State supporters I spoke with still refer to Osama bin Laden as “Sheikh Osama,” a title of honor. But jihadism has evolved since al-Qaeda’s heyday, from about 1998 to 2003, and many jihadists disdain the group’s priorities and current leadership.
我们至少在两个方面误解了伊斯兰国的性质。首先，我们倾向于认为圣战运动只有一种类型，所以把基地组织的逻辑也套用在这个已经远超基地的组织上。我接触过的伊斯兰国支持者依然尊称奥萨马·本·拉登为“奥萨马酋长”，但圣战斗士们已经从基地组织1998-2003年的全盛时期产生了变化，许多圣战斗士看不起基地组织目前的领导层，以及他们的战略部署。
Bin Laden viewed his terrorism as a prologue to a caliphate he did not expect to see in his lifetime. His organization was flexible, operating as a geographically diffuse network of autonomous cells. The Islamic State, by contrast, requires territory to remain legitimate, and a top-down structure to rule it. (Its bureaucracy is divided into civil and military arms, and its territory into provinces.)
本·拉登把自己的恐怖活动视为建立哈里发国家的前奏，而且认为在自己的有生之年看不到这个国家。他的组织灵活性强，由分散在各地联成网络的自治小组构成。而伊斯兰国要求拥有疆域维持其合法性，统治国家的是一个至上而下的结构。（它的行政机构分为行政和军事两部分，疆域也分为不同省份。）
We are misled in a second way, by a well-intentioned but dishonest campaign to deny the Islamic State’s medieval religious nature. Peter Bergen, who produced the first interview with bin Laden in 1997, titled his first book Holy War, Inc. in part to acknowledge bin Laden as a creature of the modern secular world. Bin Laden corporatized terror and franchised it out. He requested specific political concessions, such as the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Saudi Arabia. His foot soldiers navigated the modern world confidently. On Mohammad Atta’s last full day of life, he shopped at Walmart and ate dinner at Pizza Hut.
其次，我们被好心但不诚实的宣传误导了，这种宣传否认伊斯兰国的中世纪宗教性质。曾在1997年首次采访本·拉登的彼得·伯尔根，在其名为《圣战合股公司》的第一本著作中有意无意地把本·拉登当做现代世俗社会的成员。本·拉登把恐怖活动公司化，并对外发放许可。他要求特定的政治让步，比如美国军队撤出沙特阿拉伯。他的士兵在全世界自信地游荡。默罕默德·阿塔在其生命的最后一天还在沃尔玛购物，在必胜客晚餐。
Nearly all the Islamic State’s decisions adhere to what it calls, on its billboards, license plates, and coins, “the Prophetic methodology.” 几乎所有伊斯兰国的决策都遵循它自己声称的，被广泛公布在其宣传板、车牌和硬币上的“先知方式”。
There is a temptation to rehearse this observation—that jihadists are modern secular people, with modern political concerns, wearing medieval religious disguise—and make it fit the Islamic State. In fact, much of what the group does looks nonsensical except in light of a sincere, carefully considered commitment to returning civilization to a seventh-century legal environment, and ultimately to bringing about the apocalypse.
人们总是不由自主地产生这种印象 —— 圣战斗士都是现代人，有现代政治观念，只不过穿着中世纪宗教的外衣——然后把这种印象套在伊斯兰国身上。实际上，除非从虔诚地、千方百计地把世界文明拖回7世纪的法律氛围并最终引发末日决战的角度理解，否则这个组织的大部分行为看起来都是荒谬的。
The most-articulate spokesmen for that position are the Islamic State’s officials and supporters themselves. They refer derisively to “moderns.” In conversation, they insist that they will not—cannot—waver from governing precepts that were embedded in Islam by the Prophet Muhammad and his earliest followers. They often speak in codes and allusions that sound odd or old-fashioned to non-Muslims, but refer to specific traditions and texts of early Islam.
能明确说明这一点的是伊斯兰国的官员和支持者自己。他们对“现代”嗤之以鼻。在言论中他们坚持他们不会，也不能，对先知穆罕默德及其早期追随者们写在伊斯兰教中的执政戒律有任何偏离。他们经常提到的条文和典故对非穆斯林来说十分奇怪或者老套，但都与早期伊斯兰教的传统和经文有关。
To take one example: In September, Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, the Islamic State’s chief spokesman, called on Muslims in Western countries such as France and Canada to find an infidel and “smash his head with a rock,” poison him, run him over with a car, or “destroy his crops.” To Western ears, the biblical-sounding punishments—the stoning and crop destruction—juxtaposed strangely with his more modern-sounding call to vehicular homicide. (As if to show that he could terrorize by imagery alone, Adnani also referred to Secretary of State John Kerry as an “uncircumcised geezer.”)
举例来说，9月份，伊斯兰国的首席发言人阿布·穆罕默德·阿德纳尼酋长号召法国加拿大等西方国家的穆斯林找到不信道者，并把他们“用石头砸碎脑袋”、毒死、用车撞死、或者“毁坏他们的庄稼”。在西方人听来，这些犹如圣经中的古老惩罚方式，比如石刑和毁坏庄稼，与更现代的汽车谋杀并列在一起，十分奇怪。（阿德纳尼还把国务卿约翰·克里称为“没切包皮的老头”，好像他仅仅通过形象比喻就能吓唬人一样。）
But Adnani was not merely talking trash. His speech was laced with theological and legal discussion, and his exhortation to attack crops directly echoed orders from Muhammad to leave well water and crops alone—unless the armies of Islam were in a defensive position, in which case Muslims in the lands of kuffar, or infidels, should be unmerciful, and poison away.
但阿德纳尼并不是在胡言乱语。他的言论带有神学和法律的含义。他提及的毁坏庄稼直接来自穆罕默德不要伤及井水和庄稼的命令 —— 除非伊斯兰部队处于防守态势，也就是说，穆斯林在卡费勒，也就是不信道者的土地上，此时应该毫不留情，毒杀一切。
The reality is that the Islamic State is Islamic. Very Islamic. Yes, it has attracted psychopaths and adventure seekers, drawn largely from the disaffected populations of the Middle East and Europe. But the religion preached by its most ardent followers derives from coherent and even learned interpretations of Islam.
实际状况是，伊斯兰国是伊斯兰，是地地道道的伊斯兰。是的，它吸引了一些疯子，也吸引了一些机会主义者，他们大都来自中东和欧洲未受波及的地区。但它最忠实的追随者所宣扬的教义，源自对伊斯兰最直接甚至是最深刻的解读。
Virtually every major decision and law promulgated by the Islamic State adheres to what it calls, in its press and pronouncements, and on its billboards, license plates, stationery, and coins, “the Prophetic methodology,” which means following the prophecy and example of Muhammad, in punctilious detail. Muslims can reject the Islamic State; nearly all do. But pretending that it isn’t actually a religious, millenarian group, with theology that must be understood to be combatted, has already led the United States to underestimate it and back foolish schemes to counter it. We’ll need to get acquainted with the Islamic State’s intellectual genealogy if we are to react in a way that will not strengthen it, but instead help it self-immolate in its own excessive zeal.
实际上伊斯兰国制定的所有主要决策和法律，都遵循它自己声称的，被广泛公布在其宣传板、车牌、文具和硬币上的“先知方式”，即事无巨细，都遵循先知穆罕默德的教诲，或者其实际行为。穆斯林可以不接受伊斯兰国，事实上绝大多数穆斯林也的确不接受，但假装说这不是宗教性的、千年至福性的团体，不需要了解其神学特性并与之斗争，已经使美国低估了该组织，制定出的对付该组织的策略也十分愚蠢。我们必须了解伊斯兰国的知识传承，才能够削弱它，并让它因为自己的极端狂热而自我毁灭。
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Control of territory is an essential precondition for the Islamic State’s authority in the eyes of its supporters. This map, adapted from the work of the Institute for the Study of War, shows the territory under the caliphate’s control as of January 15, along with areas it has attacked. Where it holds power, the state collects taxes, regulates prices, operates courts, and administers services ranging from health care and education to telecommunications.
在支持者看来，对疆土的控制是伊斯兰国权威性的前提条件。这幅地图采自战争研究学院，显示的是截止1月15日哈里发国控制的疆域，还有它正在进攻的地域。在它统治的地区，伊斯兰国征收捐税、控制价格、设立法庭，并提供从医疗保健到教育通讯的各种服务。
I. Devotion
一、虔诚
In November, the Islamic State released an infomercial-like video tracing its origins to bin Laden. It acknowledged Abu Musa’b al Zarqawi, the brutal head of al‑Qaeda in Iraq from roughly 2003 until his killing in 2006, as a more immediate progenitor, followed sequentially by two other guerrilla leaders before Baghdadi, the caliph. Notably unmentioned: bin Laden’s successor, Ayman al Zawahiri, the owlish Egyptian eye surgeon who currently heads al‑Qaeda. Zawahiri has not pledged allegiance to Baghdadi, and he is increasingly hated by his fellow jihadists. His isolation is not helped by his lack of charisma; in videos he comes across as squinty and annoyed. But the split between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State has been long in the making, and begins to explain, at least in part, the outsize bloodlust of the latter.
去年11月，伊斯兰国公布了一段广告视频，把自己的源头追溯到本·拉登。它还把伊拉克基地组织2003到2006年的凶残领袖阿布·穆萨·阿尔·扎卡维作为自己排在拉登之后的前辈，然后更近些的是另外两个游击战领袖，然后就是巴格达迪，现任哈里发。值得注意的是，视频并没有提到本·拉登的继承人，不苟言笑的埃及眼科大夫，基地组织现任领袖艾曼·扎瓦希里。扎瓦希里并未对巴格达迪效忠，圣战斗士们也对他日渐疏远。他被孤立并不只是因为缺乏人格魅力，比如在一些视频片段中他显得有些斜眼而且烦躁。但基地组织和伊斯兰国的分裂由来已久，而且可以从某个角度说明后者为何嗜血如狂。
Zawahiri’s companion in isolation is a Jordanian cleric named Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi, 55, who has a fair claim to being al-Qaeda’s intellectual architect and the most important jihadist unknown to the average American newspaper reader. On most matters of doctrine, Maqdisi and the Islamic State agree. Both are closely identified with the jihadist wing of a branch of Sunnism called Salafism, after the Arabic al salaf al salih, the “pious forefathers.” These forefathers are the Prophet himself and his earliest adherents, whom Salafis honor and emulate as the models for all behavior, including warfare, couture, family life, even dentistry.
与扎瓦希里一同被孤立的还有一名叫阿布·穆罕默德·阿尔·马克迪斯的55岁的约旦神学家。一般相信他是基地组织的理论奠基人，也是一般美国读者不大熟悉的关键圣战斗士。在绝大多数教义上马克迪斯和伊斯兰国并没有分歧。双方都属于一个叫萨拉非的逊尼教派的圣战分支。所谓萨拉非，源自阿拉伯语“阿尔·萨拉夫·阿尔·萨利赫”，即“虔诚的先驱们”。这些先驱指的是先知本人以及他最早的追随者。萨拉非教派尊崇并效仿他们作为一切行为的模范，包括战争、服装、家庭生活，甚至牙齿健康。
The Islamic State awaits the army of “Rome,” whose defeat at Dabiq, Syria, will initiate the countdown to the apocalypse.
伊斯兰国期待着“罗马”大军的到来，并在叙利亚的大比丘击败他们，这将开启最后的末日决战。
Maqdisi taught Zarqawi, who went to war in Iraq with the older man’s advice in mind. In time, though, Zarqawi surpassed his mentor in fanaticism, and eventually earned his rebuke. At issue was Zarqawi’s penchant for bloody spectacle—and, as a matter of doctrine, his hatred of other Muslims, to the point of excommunicating and killing them. In Islam, the practice of takfir, or excommunication, is theologically perilous. “If a man says to his brother, ‘You are an infidel,’ ” the Prophet said, “then one of them is right.” If the accuser is wrong, he himself has committed apostasy by making a false accusation. The punishment for apostasy is death. And yet Zarqawi heedlessly expanded the range of behavior that could make Muslims infidels.
马克迪斯是扎卡维的导师。扎卡维是带着导师的教诲奔赴伊拉克战斗前线的。随着时间的推移，扎卡维变得比导师更加狂热，最终遭到导师的指责。问题关键在于扎卡维过于嗜血如狂——作为原则问题，他对其他穆斯林过于仇恨，甚至要将他们逐出伊斯兰教并杀死他们。在伊斯兰中，实行塔克菲尔，即将人逐出伊斯兰教，从教义上来说是邪恶的。先知曾说：“如果一个人对他的兄弟说：‘你是不信道者’，二者必伤其一。”如果指称者错了，那他就会因妄断而成为叛教者。叛教的惩罚是死刑。尽管如此，扎卡维还是毫无必要地将可以指称穆斯林为不信道者的行为范围扩大了。
Maqdisi wrote to his former pupil that he needed to exercise caution and “not issue sweeping proclamations of takfir” or “proclaim people to be apostates because of their sins.” The distinction between apostate and sinner may appear subtle, but it is a key point of contention between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.
马克迪斯写信给这位以前的学生，告诫他要谨慎行事，并且“不要不分青红皂白地实行塔克菲尔”，也不要“宣称他人因为罪过就成为叛教者。”叛教者和罪人的差别也许比较微妙，但这是基地组织和伊斯兰国的根本分歧所在。
Denying the holiness of the Koran or the prophecies of Muhammad is straightforward apostasy. But Zarqawi and the state he spawned take the position that many other acts can remove a Muslim from Islam. These include, in certain cases, selling alcohol or drugs, wearing Western clothes or shaving one’s beard, voting in an election—even for a Muslim candidate—and being lax about calling other people apostates. Being a Shiite, as most Iraqi Arabs are, meets the standard as well, because the Islamic State regards Shiism as innovation, and to innovate on the Koran is to deny its initial perfection. (The Islamic State claims that common Shiite practices, such as worship at the graves of imams and public self-flagellation, have no basis in the Koran or in the example of the Prophet.) That means roughly 200 million Shia are marked for death. So too are the heads of state of every Muslim country, who have elevated man-made law above Sharia by running for office or enforcing laws not made by God.
否认古兰经的神圣性和穆罕默德是先知毫无疑问是叛教行为。但扎卡维以及由他衍生的伊斯兰国认为还有许多其他行为可以将一个穆斯林逐出伊斯兰。这些行为在某些情况下包括，贩卖酒类和毒品、穿着西式服装、不蓄须、在选举中投票（即使是投给穆斯林候选人）、对叛教者宽松。伊拉克人口的大多数属于什叶派，而什叶派也符合这个标准，因为伊斯兰国认为什叶派篡改经书，而篡改古兰经就是否认其原始的完美性。（伊斯兰国宣称一些通行的什叶派教规，比如崇拜伊玛目陵墓和在公众场合自我鞭笞，在古兰经中都没有记载，也不是先知的行为。）这意味着大约200万的什叶派教徒都应该被处死。同样应该被处死的还有所有穆斯林国家的元首，因为他们要么曾竞逐职位，要么曾施行那些非由真主订立的法律，等于是把人为制定的法律凌驾于沙利亚法之上。
Following takfiri doctrine, the Islamic State is committed to purifying the world by killing vast numbers of people. The lack of objective reporting from its territory makes the true extent of the slaughter unknowable, but social-media posts from the region suggest that individual executions happen more or less continually, and mass executions every few weeks. Muslim “apostates” are the most common victims. Exempted from automatic execution, it appears, are Christians who do not resist their new government. Baghdadi permits them to live, as long as they pay a special tax, known as the jizya, and acknowledge their subjugation. The Koranic authority for this practice is not in dispute.
根据塔克菲尔原则，伊斯兰国必须净化世界，要杀一大批人。由于缺乏来自其统治区的客观报道，外界无法了解这种屠杀的规模，但该地区社交媒体的帖子显示处决的个案此起彼伏，而且每过几个星期，就有大规模处决的案例。穆斯林“叛教者”是最常见的受害者。但似乎不反抗新政府的基督徒倒能避过处决。巴格达迪允许他们苟活，只要他们缴纳一种称为吉兹亚的特别税，以表示自己的顺从。古兰经无可辩驳地允许这种做法。
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Musa Cerantonio, an Australian preacher reported to be one of the Islamic State’s most influential recruiters, believes it is foretold that the caliphate will sack Istanbul before it is beaten back by an army led by the anti-Messiah, whose eventual death— when just a few thousand jihadists remain—will usher in the apocalypse. (Paul Jeffers/Fairfax Media)
穆萨·塞蓝托尼奥，澳大利亚籍阿訇，据报是伊斯兰国最有影响力的招募者。他相信曾有预言，哈里发国将攻占伊斯坦布尔，然后被反对救世主的人领导的军队击败。而这位反对救世主的人最终也将死去，此时已经仅有数千圣战者幸存，这将引发最终决战。（保罗·杰菲尔斯/费尔法克斯通讯社）
Centuries have passed since the wars of religion ceased in Europe, and since men stopped dying in large numbers because of arcane theological disputes. Hence, perhaps, the incredulity and denial with which Westerners have greeted news of the theology and practices of the Islamic State. Many refuse to believe that this group is as devout as it claims to be, or as backward-looking or apocalyptic as its actions and statements suggest.Their skepticism is comprehensible. In the past, Westerners who accused Muslims of blindly following ancient scriptures came to deserved grief from academics—notably the late Edward Said—who pointed out that calling Muslims “ancient” was usually just another way to denigrate them. Look instead, these scholars urged, to the conditions in which these ideologies arose—the bad governance, the shifting social mores, the humiliation of living in lands valued only for their oil.
欧洲大地的宗教战争已经过去了几个世纪。从那以后，人类也不再因为晦涩难懂的神学争论而大规模死亡。也许正是因为如此，西方人才对伊斯兰国那些神学和教规方面的消息表示无法理解和不可相信。许多人无法相信这个团体会像他们宣称得那么虔诚，也不相信他们会像他们的行动和宣言那样，观念如此落后，笃信末日决战。这些疑问都是可以理解的。过去，指责穆斯林盲目遵循经书的西方人都遭遇到学界的质疑，其中比较有名的是已故的爱德华·赛义德。他指出说穆斯林“古老”通常是诋毁污蔑他们的另一种方式。这些学者敦促大家关注产生这些意识形态的环境，比如行政恶劣、社会道德没落、在那片土地上仅仅追逐石油而漠视生命。
Without acknowledgment of these factors, no explanation of the rise of the Islamic State could be complete. But focusing on them to the exclusion of ideology reflects another kind of Western bias: that if religious ideology doesn’t matter much in Washington or Berlin, surely it must be equally irrelevant in Raqqa or Mosul. When a masked executioner says Allahu akbar while beheading an apostate, sometimes he’s doing so for religious reasons.Many mainstream Muslim organizations have gone so far as to say the Islamic State is, in fact, un-Islamic. It is, of course, reassuring to know that the vast majority of Muslims have zero interest in replacing Hollywood movies with public executions as evening entertainment. But Muslims who call the Islamic State un-Islamic are typically, as the Princeton scholar Bernard Haykel, the leading expert on the group’s theology, told me, “embarrassed and politically correct, with a cotton-candy view of their own religion” that neglects “what their religion has historically and legally required.” Many denials of the Islamic State’s religious nature, he said, are rooted in an “interfaith-Christian-nonsense tradition.”
不考虑这些因素，任何对伊斯兰国崛起的解释都是不完整的。但仅仅关注这些而忽略意识形态又陷入另一种西方式的偏见，即：既然宗教对华盛顿和柏林无关紧要，那么对拉卡和摩苏尔肯定也是同样的无关紧要。当一个蒙面的行刑者喊着“阿拉胡阿克巴”斩首一个叛教者时，他的动机可能是出于宗教。许多主流穆斯林组织都在努力说明伊斯兰国实际上并非伊斯兰。知道绝大多数穆斯林都不希望晚间的娱乐节目从好莱坞大片换成公开处决录像当然是挺让人感到安慰的，但正如普林斯顿学者，研究伊斯兰国神学的专家伯纳德·海克尔告诉我的，那些说伊斯兰国不是伊斯兰的穆斯林都是典型地“感到不自在，而且希望政治正确，对待自己的宗教采取似是而非的态度。”这忽略了“他们的宗教在历史和教法上的要求。”许多对伊斯兰国宗教属性的否认，他说，都是源于“不同信仰间基督教别废话的传统”。
Every academic I asked about the Islamic State’s ideology sent me to Haykel. Of partial Lebanese descent, Haykel grew up in Lebanon and the United States, and when he talks through his Mephistophelian goatee, there is a hint of an unplaceable foreign accent.
关于伊斯兰国意识形态，我请教过的每个学者都把我引见给海克尔。他有黎巴嫩血统，小时候在黎巴嫩和美国都生活过，从他那诱人的山羊胡子间发出的话语，还带着一丝难以察觉的外国口音。
According to Haykel, the ranks of the Islamic State are deeply infused with religious vigor. Koranic quotations are ubiquitous. “Even the foot soldiers spout this stuff constantly,” Haykel said. “They mug for their cameras and repeat their basic doctrines in formulaic fashion, and they do it all the time.” He regards the claim that the Islamic State has distorted the texts of Islam as preposterous, sustainable only through willful ignorance. “People want to absolve Islam,” he said. “It’s this ‘Islam is a religion of peace’ mantra. As if there is such a thing as ‘Islam’! It’s what Muslims do, and how they interpret their texts.” Those texts are shared by all Sunni Muslims, not just the Islamic State. “And these guys have just as much legitimacy as anyone else.”
海克尔认为，伊斯兰国各阶层都融入了宗教的活力，随处可见对古兰经的引用。“甚至步兵都经常爆出几句，”他说。“他们一边在镜头前摆姿势，一边机械地重复基本的教义，无时无刻不这么做。”他认为那种伊斯兰国已经扭曲了伊斯兰经文的说法是荒谬的，只有刻意的忽略才能让这种说法站得住脚。“人们希望为伊斯兰开脱，”他说。“就是那个‘伊斯兰是和平宗教’的咒语，好像还真有‘伊斯兰’这么回事儿似的！其实伊斯兰就是穆斯林的所作所为，以及他们对经文的演绎。”那些经文是所有逊尼派穆斯林共有的，并不是专属于伊斯兰国。“而这些家伙和其他人具备同样的合法性。”
All Muslims acknowledge that Muhammad’s earliest conquests were not tidy affairs, and that the laws of war passed down in the Koran and in the narrations of the Prophet’s rule were calibrated to fit a turbulent and violent time. In Haykel’s estimation, the fighters of the Islamic State are authentic throwbacks to early Islam and are faithfully reproducing its norms of war. This behavior includes a number of practices that modern Muslims tend to prefer not to acknowledge as integral to their sacred texts. “Slavery, crucifixion, and beheadings are not something that freakish [jihadists] are cherry-picking from the medieval tradition,” Haykel said. Islamic State fighters “are smack in the middle of the medieval tradition and are bringing it wholesale into the present day.”
所有穆斯林都知道穆罕默德早年的征战并不都是干干净净，古兰经及圣训中流传下来的战时律例是为动乱暴戾年代度身定做的。根据海克尔的推断，伊斯兰国的斗士们才是真正倒退到了早期的伊斯兰时代，而且是在忠实地再现战时的状况。这里面包括一些现代穆斯林已不再视作属于神圣经文的做法。海克尔说：“那些变态（的圣战斗士）并不是特地从中世纪的传统中挑选了奴隶制、钉十字架、斩首，”伊斯兰国的斗士们“身陷中世纪传统之中，并把它整个带进了现代社会。”
Our failure to appreciate the essential differences between ISIS and al-Qaeda has led to dangerous decisions.
未能分清ISIS和基地组织的根本区别已经导致了危险的决策
The Koran specifies crucifixion as one of the only punishments permitted for enemies of Islam. The tax on Christians finds clear endorsement in the Surah Al-Tawba, the Koran’s ninth chapter, which instructs Muslims to fight Christians and Jews “until they pay the jizya with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued.” The Prophet, whom all Muslims consider exemplary, imposed these rules and owned slaves.
古兰经钉十字架是允许对伊斯兰的敌人施行的少数几种惩罚之一。在古兰经第九章忏悔中，明确允许对基督徒征税，并教导穆斯林讨伐基督徒和犹太教徒，“直到他们顺从地缴纳吉兹亚税，并真心臣服。”被所有穆斯林奉为榜样的先知，践行了这些规则，而且也曾蓄奴。
Leaders of the Islamic State have taken emulation of Muhammad as strict duty, and have revived traditions that have been dormant for hundreds of years. “What’s striking about them is not just the literalism, but also the seriousness with which they read these texts,” Haykel said. “There is an assiduous, obsessive seriousness that Muslims don’t normally have.”
伊斯兰国的领袖们把效仿穆罕默德严格作为自己的职责，并恢复了一些沉寂了数百年的传统。“令人震惊的不只是他们对经文的执着，更是他们阅读经文的认真态度，”海克尔说，“这是一种普通穆斯林所不具备的不折不扣、近乎病态的认真态度。”
Before the rise of the Islamic State, no group in the past few centuries had attempted more-radical fidelity to the Prophetic model than the Wahhabis of 18th‑century Arabia. They conquered most of what is now Saudi Arabia, and their strict practices survive in a diluted version of Sharia there. Haykel sees an important distinction between the groups, though: “The Wahhabis were not wanton in their violence.” They were surrounded by Muslims, and they conquered lands that were already Islamic; this stayed their hand. “ISIS, by contrast, is really reliving the early period.” Early Muslims were surrounded by non-Muslims, and the Islamic State, because of its takfiri tendencies, considers itself to be in the same situation.
伊斯兰国兴起之前，在过去的几个世纪中，最忠实地遵从先知的是18世纪阿拉伯地区的瓦哈比教派。他们征服了今天沙特阿拉伯的大部地区，他们的严格教规今天还以一种稍微宽松的沙利亚法在当地实行着。海克尔认为这两者之间也有重大区别，虽然：“瓦哈比教派并不滥用暴力。”他们周围也是穆斯林，他们征服的区域本来也已伊斯兰化，没必要下重手。“ISIS却生活在更早的年代。”早期的穆斯林是被非穆斯林包围的，而伊斯兰国，由于其塔克菲尔倾向，认为自己处于同样的境地。
If al Qaeda wanted to revive slavery, it never said so. And why would it? Silence on slavery probably reflected strategic thinking, with public sympathies in mind: when the Islamic State began enslaving people, even some of its supporters balked. Nonetheless, the caliphate has continued to embrace slavery and crucifixion without apology. “We will conquer your Rome, break your crosses, and enslave your women,” Adnani, the spokesman, promised in one of his periodic valentines to the West. “If we do not reach that time, then our children and grandchildren will reach it, and they will sell your sons as slaves at the slave market.”
即使基地组织想恢复奴隶制，它也从来没这么说过。干嘛要说呢？悄悄地蓄奴也许是一种战略思考，起码考虑到了公众情绪。当伊斯兰国开始公开蓄奴时，它的一些支持者都退缩了。尽管如此，哈里发国还是毫无愧疚地继续拥抱奴隶制，并施行钉十字架的刑罚。发言人阿德纳尼在一次例行的发布会上对西方叫嚣道：“我们将征服你们的罗马，打断你们的十字架，把你们的女人充为奴隶。如果我们见不到那天，我们的子孙将见到那天，他们会把你们的子孙在市场上卖作奴隶。”
In October, Dabiq, the magazine of the Islamic State, published “The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour,” an article that took up the question of whether Yazidis (the members of an ancient Kurdish sect that borrows elements of Islam, and had come under attack from Islamic State forces in northern Iraq) are lapsed Muslims, and therefore marked for death, or merely pagans and therefore fair game for enslavement. A study group of Islamic State scholars had convened, on government orders, to resolve this issue. If they are pagans, the article’s anonymous author wrote,
十月份的伊斯兰国杂志《大比丘》发表了一篇文章，名为《立即恢复奴隶制》，其中提出的问题是，雅兹迪人（一支古老的库尔德教派，曾借用一些伊斯兰的元素，在伊拉克北部遭受伊斯兰国的攻击）是犯了错的穆斯林，因而应该被处死，还是仅仅是异教徒，因而应该合理地被充作奴隶。伊斯兰国政府下令成立一个学者组成的研究小组来解决这个问题。如果他们是异教徒，这篇未署名的文章写道：
Yazidi women and children [are to be] divided according to the Shariah amongst the fighters of the Islamic State who participated in the Sinjar operations [in northern Iraq] … Enslaving the families of the kuffar [infidels] and taking their women as concubines is a firmly established aspect of the Shariah that if one were to deny or mock, he would be denying or mocking the verses of the Koran and the narrations of the Prophet … and thereby apostatizing from Islam.
雅兹迪女人和孩子（应该）根据沙利亚法分配给参加辛贾尔（伊拉克北部）行动的伊斯兰国战士……把卡费勒（不信道者）的家庭充奴，纳他们的女人为妾，都是沙利亚法中明确规定的。任何人如果否认或者怀疑这一点，就是否认和怀疑古兰经文以及圣训的教诲……因此就是伊斯兰的叛教者。
II. Territory
领土
Tens of thousands of foreign Muslims are thought to have immigrated to the Islamic State. Recruits hail from France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, Holland, Australia, Indonesia, the United States, and many other places. Many have come to fight, and many intend to die.
据估算，数以万计的外国穆斯林已经移民伊斯兰国。来源地包括法国、英国、比利时、德国、荷兰、澳大利亚、印度尼西亚、美国，还有很多其他地方。他们是来战斗，许多人还抱着必死的决心。
Peter R. Neumann, a professor at King’s College London, told me that online voices have been essential to spreading propaganda and ensuring that newcomers know what to believe. Online recruitment has also widened the demographics of the jihadist community, by allowing conservative Muslim women—physically isolated in their homes—to reach out to recruiters, radicalize, and arrange passage to Syria. Through its appeals to both genders, the Islamic State hopes to build a complete society.
伦敦国王学院教授彼得·纽曼告诉我，网络成为传播宣传和确保新人信仰的基本手段。网络招募也让困在家中的保守穆斯林妇女能够接触到招募者，变得激进，并得以去往叙利亚，这拓宽了圣战组织的人员构成。伊斯兰国希望同时吸引男女两性，建立一个完整的社会。
In November, I traveled to Australia to meet Musa Cerantonio, a 30-year-old man whom Neumann and other researchers had identified as one of the two most important “new spiritual authorities” guiding foreigners to join the Islamic State. For three years he was a televangelist on Iqraa TV in Cairo, but he left after the station objected to his frequent calls to establish a caliphate. Now he preaches on Facebook and Twitter.
去年11月，我到澳大利亚拜访了穆萨·赛兰托尼奥，他30岁，被纽曼和其他学者称为两位最重要的“新思想权威”之一，引导外国人加入伊斯兰国。他曾在开罗的伊卡拉电视台布道三年，但因电视台反对他一再呼吁建立哈里发国而离开。目前他通过脸书和推特传教。
Cerantonio—a big, friendly man with a bookish demeanor—told me he blanches at beheading videos. He hates seeing the violence, even though supporters of the Islamic State are required to endorse it. (He speaks out, controversially among jihadists, against suicide bombing, on the grounds that God forbids suicide; he differs from the Islamic State on a few other points as well.) He has the kind of unkempt facial hair one sees on certain overgrown fans of The Lord of the Rings, and his obsession with Islamic apocalypticism felt familiar. He seemed to be living out a drama that looks, from an outsider’s perspective, like a medieval fantasy novel, only with real blood.
赛兰托尼奥身形魁梧，为人和善，还带点书生气。他告诉我看到斩首视频也吓得脸色刷白。虽然伊斯兰国要求支持者接受，他依然憎恨暴力。（他也公开声称反对自杀炸弹，因为真主禁止自杀，这一点在圣战斗士间有争议；他在其他几个问题上也与伊斯兰国意见不一。）他一脸蓬乱的络腮胡子，就像是个《魔戒》的超龄粉丝。在外人看来，他似乎是活在中世纪幻想小说的剧情中，只是身上有血有肉。
Last June, Cerantonio and his wife tried to emigrate—he wouldn’t say to where (“It’s illegal to go to Syria,” he said cagily)—but they were caught en route, in the Philippines, and he was deported back to Australia for overstaying his visa. Australia has criminalized attempts to join or travel to the Islamic State, and has confiscated Cerantonio’s passport. He is stuck in Melbourne, where he is well known to the local constabulary. If Cerantonio were caught facilitating the movement of individuals to the Islamic State, he would be imprisoned. So far, though, he is free—a technically unaffiliated ideologue who nonetheless speaks with what other jihadists have taken to be a reliable voice on matters of the Islamic State’s doctrine.
去年六月，赛兰托尼奥和夫人试图移民国外——他不说目的地（“去叙利亚是违法的，”他小心说道。）——但途中在菲律宾被截获，并因逾期居留被遣返澳大利亚。在澳大利亚，企图加入或者去往伊斯兰国是刑事罪行，赛兰托尼奥的护照被没收。他目前滞留在墨尔本，成了当地警界的熟客。如果发现赛兰托尼奥协助任何人去往伊斯兰国，他将被捕入狱。到目前为止他还是自由的——从技术上来说，他还是个与伊斯兰国无关的理论家，虽然他有关伊斯兰国教义事务的言论已经被其他圣战者视作可靠无疑。
We met for lunch in Footscray, a dense, multicultural Melbourne suburb that’s home to Lonely Planet, the travel-guide publisher. Cerantonio grew up there in a half-Irish, half-Calabrian family. On a typical street one can find African restaurants, Vietnamese shops, and young Arabs walking around in the Salafi uniform of scraggly beard, long shirt, and trousers ending halfway down the calves.
我们约在富茨克雷吃午饭，这是墨尔本郊区一个人口密集，文化多元的社区，也是导游书刊《孤独星球》的发祥地。赛兰托尼奥在这里长大，有一半爱尔兰血统，一半卡拉布里亚（意大利南部城市）血统。这里的街上可以看到非洲餐馆，越南小店，还有萨拉非派的阿拉伯年轻人来来往往，他们的特征是留着短短的胡须，长衬衫，裤脚只到腿肚子。
Cerantonio explained the joy he felt when Baghdadi was declared the caliph on June 29—and the sudden, magnetic attraction that Mesopotamia began to exert on him and his friends. “I was in a hotel [in the Philippines], and I saw the declaration on television,” he told me. “And I was just amazed, and I’m like, Why am I stuck here in this bloody room?”
赛兰托尼奥向我描述了6月29日巴格达迪宣布成为哈里发时他的喜悦之情，以及两河流域对他和朋友的那种突如其来的，如磁石般的吸引力。“当时我在（菲律宾的）酒店里，看着电视直播，”他告诉我，“我一阵惊喜，就好像，我还呆在这破房间里干嘛啊？”
The last caliphate was the Ottoman empire, which reached its peak in the 16th century and then experienced a long decline, until the founder of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, euthanized it in 1924. But Cerantonio, like many supporters of the Islamic State, doesn’t acknowledge that caliphate as legitimate, because it didn’t fully enforce Islamic law, which requires stonings and slavery and amputations, and because its caliphs were not descended from the tribe of the Prophet, the Quraysh.
最后一个哈里发国是奥斯曼帝国，它在16世纪到达顶峰，然后慢慢衰败，直到1924年土耳其共和国的缔造者穆斯塔法·凯末尔·阿塔土克让其寿终正寝。但和许多伊斯兰国的支持者一样，赛兰托尼奥并不认可那个哈里发国的合法性，因为它并未实行包含石刑、奴隶制和斩肢的伊斯兰法，而且它的哈里发也不是先知所属的古莱氏族的后裔。
Baghdadi spoke at length of the importance of the caliphate in his Mosul sermon. He said that to revive the institution of the caliphate—which had not functioned except in name for about 1,000 years—was a communal obligation. He and his loyalists had “hastened to declare the caliphate and place an imam” at its head, he said. “This is a duty upon the Muslims—a duty that has been lost for centuries … The Muslims sin by losing it, and they must always seek to establish it.” Like bin Laden before him, Baghdadi spoke floridly, with frequent scriptural allusion and command of classical rhetoric. Unlike bin Laden, and unlike those false caliphs of the Ottoman empire, he is Qurayshi.
巴格达迪在摩苏尔布道中用很大篇幅阐述这个哈里发国的重要性。他说哈里发国已经名存实亡了大约一千年，复兴哈里发国是大家共同的义务。他和追随者们“加紧宣布成立哈里发国，并确立了领袖”。“这是穆斯林的责任——这种责任已经失传了好几个世纪……丢失这个传统是穆斯林的罪过，我们必须努力重建它。”与他之前的本·拉登一样，巴格达迪言辞华丽，经常引经据典，还使用古典韵律。与本·拉登不同，也与奥斯曼帝国的那些假哈里发不同，巴格达迪是古莱氏。
The caliphate, Cerantonio told me, is not just a political entity but also a vehicle for salvation. Islamic State propaganda regularly reports the pledges of baya’a (allegiance) rolling in from jihadist groups across the Muslim world. Cerantonio quoted a Prophetic saying, that to die without pledging allegiance is to die jahil (ignorant) and therefore die a “death of disbelief.” Consider how Muslims (or, for that matter, Christians) imagine God deals with the souls of people who die without learning about the one true religion. They are neither obviously saved nor definitively condemned. Similarly, Cerantonio said, the Muslim who acknowledges one omnipotent god and prays, but who dies without pledging himself to a valid caliph and incurring the obligations of that oath, has failed to live a fully Islamic life. I pointed out that this means the vast majority of Muslims in history, and all who passed away between 1924 and 2014, died a death of disbelief. Cerantonio nodded gravely. “I would go so far as to say that Islam has been reestablished” by the caliphate.
赛兰托尼奥告诉我，哈里发国不仅是个政治实体，也是通向救赎的媒介。伊斯兰国的宣传经常报道穆斯林世界各种圣战组织对其表示巴亚阿（效忠）的消息。赛兰托尼奥引述先知的话说，不效忠就死，就是死在贾希尔（无知）之中，因此就是一种“不信道的死法”。考虑一下，穆斯林（这点基督徒也一样）心目中真主会如何处理那些不知道自己真正宗教信仰就死去的人的灵魂。它们既不会得到明显的救赎，也不一定会被定罪。同样的，赛兰托尼奥说，那些信奉全能的真主并顶礼膜拜的穆斯林，如果死前连个正统的哈里发都没有效忠过，而且没履行过效忠的责任，那么他的一生就不是完整的伊斯兰。我指出如果这么说，那么历史上绝大多数穆斯林，还有那些死于1924年至2014年之间的所有穆斯林，都是不信道的死法。赛兰托尼奥沉重地点点头：“我只能说，”哈里发国“已经重建伊斯兰。”
I asked him about his own baya’a, and he quickly corrected me: “I didn’t say that I’d pledged allegiance.” Under Australian law, he reminded me, giving baya’a to the Islamic State was illegal. “But I agree that [Baghdadi] fulfills the requirements,” he continued. “I’m just going to wink at you, and you take that to mean whatever you want.”
我问他自己的巴亚阿，他立即纠正我：“我没说要宣誓效忠。”他提醒我，澳大利亚法律规定向伊斯兰国表示巴亚阿是非法的。“但我同意（巴格达迪）符合要求，”他继续道，“我就给你眨下眼，你可以随意解读。”
To be the caliph, one must meet conditions outlined in Sunni law—being a Muslim adult man of Quraysh descent; exhibiting moral probity and physical and mental integrity; and having ’amr, or authority. This last criterion, Cerantonio said, is the hardest to fulfill, and requires that the caliph have territory in which he can enforce Islamic law. Baghdadi’s Islamic State achieved that long before June 29, Cerantonio said, and as soon as it did, a Western convert within the group’s ranks—Cerantonio described him as “something of a leader”—began murmuring about the religious obligation to declare a caliphate. He and others spoke quietly to those in power and told them that further delay would be sinful.
成为哈里发必须符合逊尼教法中规定的条件——必须是古莱氏族的成年穆斯林男子，为人诚实正直，身心健康，还要具备雅姆尔，即权威。这最后一点，赛兰托尼奥说，是最难的，需要哈里发拥有领土，并在其上施行伊斯兰法。赛兰托尼奥说，巴格达迪的伊斯兰国在6月29日前很早就具备了这一点，而且一做到这一点，集团内的一个来自西方的高层，赛兰托尼奥称其为“大概是领袖吧”，就开始谈论宣布立国的宗教责任。他和其他人向掌权的人不断建言，说再推迟是有罪的。
来自伊斯兰国的社交媒体帖子表明死刑处决几乎不断发生。
Cerantonio said a faction arose that was prepared to make war on Baghdadi’s group if it delayed any further. They prepared a letter to various powerful members of ISIS, airing their displeasure at the failure to appoint a caliph, but were pacified by Adnani, the spokesman, who let them in on a secret—that a caliphate had already been declared, long before the public announcement. They had their legitimate caliph, and at that point there was only one option. “If he’s legitimate,” Cerantonio said, “you must give him the baya’a.”
赛兰托尼奥说已经形成了一个派别，如果巴格达迪的团体再推迟立国，就对他宣战。他们致信ISIS中各种实权人物，表达对未能设立哈里发的不满，但发言人阿德纳尼平息了他们。阿德纳尼告诉他们一个秘密：在公开宣布之前很久，哈里发国就已经成立了。他们有合法的哈里发，而且当时也只有一个候选人。“如果他合法，”赛兰托尼奥说，“你们就必须对他宣誓巴亚阿。”
After Baghdadi’s July sermon, a stream of jihadists began flowing daily into Syria with renewed motivation. Jürgen Todenhöfer, a German author and former politician who visited the Islamic State in December, reported the arrival of 100 fighters at one Turkish-border recruitment station in just two days. His report, among others, suggests a still-steady inflow of foreigners, ready to give up everything at home for a shot at paradise in the worst place on Earth.
巴格达迪的7月布道之后，圣战斗士们得到了新的力量，开始每日不断地流入叙利亚。曾在12月走访过伊斯兰国的德国作家兼政治家尤根·托登霍夫报道，仅仅两天内就有一百名斗士抵达土耳其边境的一个招募站。他和其他报道都表明，外国人的加盟源源不断，他们准备放弃家里的一切，到地球上最恶劣的地方，为天堂里争一席之地。
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Bernard Haykel, the foremost secular authority on the Islamic State’s ideology, believes the group is trying to re-create the earliest days of Islam and is faithfully reproducing its norms of war. “There is an assiduous, obsessive seriousness” about the group’s dedication to the text of the Koran, he says. (Peter Murphy)
伯纳德·海克尔是伊斯兰国意识形态最权威的世俗学者。他相信这个团体企图重建伊斯兰最初的样子，并正在不遗余力地再造战争环境。他说：这个团体对待古兰经文有一种“不折不扣、近乎病态的认真态度”。（彼得·墨菲摄）
In London, a week before my meal with Cerantonio, I met with three ex-members of a banned Islamist group called Al Muhajiroun (The Emigrants): Anjem Choudary, Abu Baraa, and Abdul Muhid. They all expressed desire to emigrate to the Islamic State, as many of their colleagues already had, but the authorities had confiscated their passports. Like Cerantonio, they regarded the caliphate as the only righteous government on Earth, though none would confess having pledged allegiance. Their principal goal in meeting me was to explain what the Islamic State stands for, and how its policies reflect God’s law.
与赛兰托尼奥午餐前一个星期，我在伦敦见了三位已被查禁的伊斯兰团体阿尔-穆哈吉隆（迁者）成员：安杰姆·乔达瑞、阿布·巴拉阿，和阿卜都勒·穆希德。他们都表达了迁往伊斯兰国的愿望，而且他们很多伙伴都已经去了，但官方收缴了他们的护照。和赛兰托尼奥一样，他们认为哈里发国是地球上唯一正当的政府，当然他们谁也不会公开表示效忠。他们与我见面的首要目的是要向我说明伊斯兰国的意义，它的政策反映着真主的法律。
Choudary, 48, is the group’s former leader. He frequently appears on cable news, as one of the few people producers can book who will defend the Islamic State vociferously, until his mike is cut. He has a reputation in the United Kingdom as a loathsome blowhard, but he and his disciples sincerely believe in the Islamic State and, on matters of doctrine, speak in its voice. Choudary and the others feature prominently in the Twitter feeds of Islamic State residents, and Abu Baraa maintains a YouTube channel to answer questions about Sharia.
48岁的乔达瑞是这个团体以前的领袖。他经常在CNN露面，是台方能够找到的，屈指可数的几个能为伊斯兰国激烈辩护的人物之一，而且常常说到被切断麦克风。他在英国的形象是个令人讨厌的牛皮大王，但他和他的弟子们都坚定地信赖伊斯兰国，而且在教义问题上，与伊斯兰国同声同气。乔达瑞等人是推特上有关伊斯兰国民消息的名人，阿布·巴拉阿维护着一个油管频道，解答有关沙利亚法的问题。
Since September, authorities have been investigating the three men on suspicion of supporting terrorism. Because of this investigation, they had to meet me separately: communication among them would have violated the terms of their bail. But speaking with them felt like speaking with the same person wearing different masks. Choudary met me in a candy shop in the East London suburb of Ilford. He was dressed smartly, in a crisp blue tunic reaching nearly to his ankles, and sipped a Red Bull while we talked.
从9月开始，当局因怀疑这三个人支持恐怖主义而对他们进行调查。由于这种调查，他们不得不分开见我：他们之间的任何交往都会违反假释条件。但跟他们交谈就好像在和戴着不同面具的同一个人说话。乔达瑞在伦敦东郊伊尔福德的一家糖果店里和我见面。他穿得很精神，披着鲜蓝色的外套，几乎垂到脚踝。他一边和我说话，一边吸着红牛。
Before the caliphate, “maybe 85 percent of the Sharia was absent from our lives,” Choudary told me. “These laws are in abeyance until we have khilafa”—a caliphate—“and now we have one.” Without a caliphate, for example, individual vigilantes are not obliged to amputate the hands of thieves they catch in the act. But create a caliphate, and this law, along with a huge body of other jurisprudence, suddenly awakens. In theory, all Muslims are obliged to immigrate to the territory where the caliph is applying these laws. One of Choudary’s prize students, a convert from Hinduism named Abu Rumaysah, evaded police to bring his family of five from London to Syria in November. On the day I met Choudary, Abu Rumaysah tweeted out a picture of himself with a Kalashnikov in one arm and his newborn son in the other. Hashtag: #GenerationKhilafah.
乔达瑞告诉我：“哈里发国成立之前，也许85%的沙利亚法律都已经在我们的生活中消失了。在基拉法（即哈里发国，基拉法是阿拉伯语哈里发国的发音）之前，它们都被搁置了，现在我们有了。”举例来说，没有哈里发国，个人抓了小偷的现行，也不一定要斩下他的手。但哈里发建国后，沙利亚法及其他大量的法理都复苏了。从理论上说，所有穆斯林都有义务迁往哈里发施行这些法律的地区。乔达瑞的得意门生，从印度教皈依的阿布·鲁梅萨，就是带着一家五口躲过了警方的堵截，在11月从伦敦到了叙利亚。就在我和乔达瑞见面的那天，阿布·鲁梅萨在推特上贴了张照片，他一手举着卡拉什尼科夫冲锋枪，另一手抱着初生的儿子。主题标签：#基拉法世代。
The caliph is required to implement Sharia. Any deviation will compel those who have pledged allegiance to inform the caliph in private of his error and, in extreme cases, to excommunicate and replace him if he persists. (“I have been plagued with this great matter, plagued with this responsibility, and it is a heavy responsibility,” Baghdadi said in his sermon.) In return, the caliph commands obedience—and those who persist in supporting non-Muslim governments, after being duly warned and educated about their sin, are considered apostates.
哈里发必须施行沙利亚法，任何偏离都会导致效忠者私下提醒其错误，而且在极端情况下，如果他拒不改正，可以将他逐出教门并取而代之。（巴格达迪在其布道中说：“我被迫承担大业，被迫履行这份责任，这份责任极为沉重。”）作为回报，哈里发要求服从——那些执迷不悟支持非穆斯林政府的，经警告教育仍不悔改，就是叛教者。
Choudary said Sharia has been misunderstood because of its incomplete application by regimes such as Saudi Arabia, which does behead murderers and cut off thieves’ hands. “The problem,” he explained, “is that when places like Saudi Arabia just implement the penal code, and don’t provide the social and economic justice of the Sharia—the whole package—they simply engender hatred toward the Sharia.” That whole package, he said, would include free housing, food, and clothing for all, though of course anyone who wished to enrich himself with work could do so.
乔达瑞说沙利亚法被误解了，因为它未能在像沙特阿拉伯这样的国家得到全面实施，虽然他们也斩首杀人犯，也砍下小偷的手。“问题在于，”他解释说，“沙特阿拉伯这种地方只实行惩罚，而不提供沙利亚法规定的社会和经济平等，这是不全面的。他们只是在引起对沙利亚法的仇恨。”全面的沙利亚法，他说，应该包括给所有人免费住房、食物和服装，当然人们也可以通过工作获得这一切。
Abdul Muhid, 32, continued along these lines. He was dressed in mujahideen chic when I met him at a local restaurant: scruffy beard, Afghan cap, and a wallet outside of his clothes, attached with what looked like a shoulder holster. When we sat down, he was eager to discuss welfare. The Islamic State may have medieval-style punishments for moral crimes (lashes for boozing or fornication, stoning for adultery), but its social-welfare program is, at least in some aspects, progressive to a degree that would please an MSNBC pundit. Health care, he said, is free. (“Isn’t it free in Britain, too?,” I asked. “Not really,” he said. “Some procedures aren’t covered, such as vision.”) This provision of social welfare was not, he said, a policy choice of the Islamic State, but a policy obligation inherent in God’s law.
32岁的阿卜都勒·穆希德进一步阐述了这些观点。我和他在一家当地餐馆会面，他一副圣战者打扮，胡子拉碴，戴着顶阿富汗小帽，钱包挂在衣服外面，连着一条看起来像肩带的东西。一坐下来，他就迫不及待地谈起福利制度。伊斯兰国对道德罪行的惩处也许是中世纪的（酗酒和淫乱处以鞭刑，通奸是石刑），但它的社会福利制度却是，至少在某些方面，已经发展到能够让MSNBC评论员满意的程度。卫生保健，他说，就是免费的。（“英国不也是吗？”我问。“不见得，”他说，“有些不包，比如视力。”）提供这些社会福利，他说，并不是伊斯兰国自己选择的政策，而是真主法律要求的义务。
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Anjem Choudary, London’s most notorious defender of the Islamic State, says crucifixion and beheading are sacred requirements. (Tal Cohen/Reuters)
安杰姆·乔达瑞，伦敦最臭名昭著的伊斯兰国辩护人，说钉十字架和斩首都是神圣的要求。（塔尔·科恩/路透社）
III. The Apocalypse
末日决战
All Muslims acknowledge that God is the only one who knows the future. But they also agree that he has offered us a peek at it, in the Koran and in narrations of the Prophet. The Islamic State differs from nearly every other current jihadist movement in believing that it is written into God’s script as a central character. It is in this casting that the Islamic State is most boldly distinctive from its predecessors, and clearest in the religious nature of its mission.
所有穆斯林都认为只有真主才能预知未来。但他们同时也认为在古兰经和圣训中，真主让我们窥探未来。伊斯兰国与其他所有近代圣战运动不同的就是他们相信这些预言是作为中心思想写在真主的经文当中的。正是这种特质让伊斯兰国与其各种前辈有显著差异，也使伊斯兰国对自身使命的宗教性质一清二楚。
In broad strokes, al-Qaeda acts like an underground political movement, with worldly goals in sight at all times—the expulsion of non-Muslims from the Arabian peninsula, the abolishment of the state of Israel, the end of support for dictatorships in Muslim lands. The Islamic State has its share of worldly concerns (including, in the places it controls, collecting garbage and keeping the water running), but the End of Days is a leitmotif of its propaganda. Bin Laden rarely mentioned the apocalypse, and when he did, he seemed to presume that he would be long dead when the glorious moment of divine comeuppance finally arrived. “Bin Laden and Zawahiri are from elite Sunni families who look down on this kind of speculation and think it’s something the masses engage in,” says Will McCants of the Brookings Institution, who is writing a book about the Islamic State’s apocalyptic thought.
广义来说，基地组织的行为像地下政治运动，他们随时都有与世俗世界相关的目标——将非穆斯林逐出阿拉伯半岛，摧毁以色列国，终结穆斯林土地上的独裁政权。伊斯兰国也有与世俗的任务（包括在占领的区域清理垃圾和供水），但世界末日才是他们宣传的主旋律。本·拉登很少提及末日决战，而且即使提到，也似乎认为要在自己死后很久，这个由神最终裁决的光辉时刻才会来临。“本·拉登和扎瓦希里出身逊尼精英家庭，看不起这种臆测，认为只有普罗百姓才会这么胡思乱想，”布鲁金斯学会的威尔·麦坎茨说道。他正在写一本关于伊斯兰国末日决战思想的书。
During the last years of the U.S. occupation of Iraq, the Islamic State’s immediate founding fathers, by contrast, saw signs of the end times everywhere. They were anticipating, within a year, the arrival of the Mahdi—a messianic figure destined to lead the Muslims to victory before the end of the world. McCants says a prominent Islamist in Iraq approached bin Laden in 2008 to warn him that the group was being led by millenarians who were “talking all the time about the Mahdi and making strategic decisions” based on when they thought the Mahdi was going to arrive. “Al-Qaeda had to write to [these leaders] to say ‘Cut it out.’ ”
在美国占领伊拉克的最后几年，伊斯兰国的直接奠基人却到处看到末日的迹象。他们期待着在一年内马赫迪就会降临。马赫迪就是在世界末日来临前带领穆斯林走向胜利的救世主式人物。麦坎茨说，有位伊拉克的著名伊斯兰主义者就曾在2008年警告本·拉登，说这个团体的领导是千年至福说的信徒，他们“不停地谈论马赫迪，”并根据他们推测的马赫迪降临日期“制定战略决策”。“基地组织不得不去信（这些领导），让他们‘别说了’。”
For certain true believers—the kind who long for epic good-versus-evil battles—visions of apocalyptic bloodbaths fulfill a deep psychological need. Of the Islamic State supporters I met, Musa Cerantonio, the Australian, expressed the deepest interest in the apocalypse and how the remaining days of the Islamic State—and the world—might look. Parts of that prediction are original to him, and do not yet have the status of doctrine. But other parts are based on mainstream Sunni sources and appear all over the Islamic State’s propaganda. These include the belief that there will be only 12 legitimate caliphs, and Baghdadi is the eighth; that the armies of Rome will mass to meet the armies of Islam in northern Syria; and that Islam’s final showdown with an anti-Messiah will occur in Jerusalem after a period of renewed Islamic conquest.
对于某些真正的信徒来说——他们渴望史诗般的善恶对决——末日决战的浴血场面可以满足深层的心理需要。我见过的伊斯兰国支持者，比如澳大利亚的穆萨·赛兰托尼奥，就表现出对末日决战的浓厚兴趣，而且也关注末日来临之前伊斯兰国和世界的样子。他的预测一部分是自己原创，不在教义之中。但其他部分是基于主流的逊尼派经文，并在伊斯兰国的宣传中随处可见。其中包括将只有12位哈里发，巴格达迪是第八位；罗马军队将在叙利亚北部与伊斯兰军队大规模遭遇，伊斯兰与反救世主的最后对决将在在耶路撒冷发生，时间是伊斯兰重新占领耶路撒冷一段时间后。
The Islamic State has attached great importance to the Syrian city of Dabiq, near Aleppo. It named its propaganda magazine after the town, and celebrated madly when (at great cost) it conquered Dabiq’s strategically unimportant plains. It is here, the Prophet reportedly said, that the armies of Rome will set up their camp. The armies of Islam will meet them, and Dabiq will be Rome’s Waterloo or its Antietam.
伊斯兰国赋予叙利亚城市大比丘格外的重视。大比丘位于阿勒颇附近，伊斯兰国以它的名字命名自己的宣传刊物，并在占领该市并无战略价值的平原之后疯狂庆祝。正是这里，先知据报曾说过，罗马大军将安营扎寨。伊斯兰大军将在此与其遭遇，大比丘就是罗马的滑铁卢，或者安提塔姆（美国南北战争中的转折点）。
“Dabiq is basically all farmland,” one Islamic State supporter recently tweeted. “You could imagine large battles taking place there.” The Islamic State’s propagandists drool with anticipation of this event, and constantly imply that it will come soon. The state’s magazine quotes Zarqawi as saying, “The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify … until it burns the crusader armies in Dabiq.” A recent propaganda video shows clips from Hollywood war movies set in medieval times—perhaps because many of the prophecies specify that the armies will be on horseback or carrying ancient weapons.
“大比丘基本上都是农田，”一位伊斯兰国的支持者最近在推特上写道。“可以想见，这里可以举行大规模战斗。”伊斯兰国的宣传家做梦都期望着这场战斗，而且不断暗示它会很快到来。伊斯兰国杂志引述扎卡维说：“星星之火在伊拉克点起，强度不断提高……直到在大比丘烧向十字军的部队。”一段近期的宣传视频播放了一段好莱坞中世纪战争片——也许是因为不少预言都明确指出两支大军将骑马作战，使用的也是古代兵器。
Now that it has taken Dabiq, the Islamic State awaits the arrival of an enemy army there, whose defeat will initiate the countdown to the apocalypse. Western media frequently miss references to Dabiq in the Islamic State’s videos, and focus instead on lurid scenes of beheading. “Here we are, burying the first American crusader in Dabiq, eagerly waiting for the remainder of your armies to arrive,” said a masked executioner in a November video, showing the severed head of Peter (Abdul Rahman) Kassig, the aid worker who’d been held captive for more than a year. During fighting in Iraq in December, after mujahideen (perhaps inaccurately) reported having seen American soldiers in battle, Islamic State Twitter accounts erupted in spasms of pleasure, like overenthusiastic hosts or hostesses upon the arrival of the first guests at a party.
现在已经占领了大比丘，伊斯兰国在这里等待敌军的到来，击败他们，就会开启末日决战的倒数。西方媒体经常错过伊斯兰国视频中有关大比丘的片段，而只是关注那些骇人的斩首场景。“我们这是在大比丘埋葬第一个美国十字军，并期待你们其他部队的来临，”11月的一段视频中，蒙面的行刑者说道。视频中展现着彼得·（阿卜杜勒·拉赫曼）卡西格被斩下的头颅，他是一位救援人员，此前已被关押一年多。12月在伊拉克的战斗中，圣战队员们报告（也许是误报）看到了美国士兵，伊斯兰国的推特账号爆发了狂喜，就像聚会主人看到第一位客人到来那样欣喜若狂。
The Prophetic narration that foretells the Dabiq battle refers to the enemy as Rome. Who “Rome” is, now that the pope has no army, remains a matter of debate. But Cerantonio makes a case that Rome meant the Eastern Roman empire, which had its capital in what is now Istanbul. We should think of Rome as the Republic of Turkey—the same republic that ended the last self-identified caliphate, 90 years ago. Other Islamic State sources suggest that Rome might mean any infidel army, and the Americans will do nicely.
圣训预言，大比丘之战的敌人是罗马。谁是“罗马”是有争议的，因为教皇目前已经没有军队。但赛兰托尼奥认为罗马指的是东罗马帝国，其首都是今天的伊斯坦布尔。我们应该认为罗马就是土耳其共和国——就是90年前终结最后一个自封哈里发国的那个共和国。其他伊斯兰国人士认为罗马也可以是指任何异教徒的军队，美国军队完全符合。
After mujahideen reported having seen American soldiers in battle, Islamic State Twitter accounts erupted in spasms of pleasure, like overenthusiastic hosts upon the arrival of the first guests at a party.
圣战队员报告在战斗中看到美军士兵之后，伊斯兰国的推特账号爆发了狂喜，就像聚会主人看到第一位客人到来那样欣喜若狂。
After its battle in Dabiq, Cerantonio said, the caliphate will expand and sack Istanbul. Some believe it will then cover the entire Earth, but Cerantonio suggested its tide may never reach beyond the Bosporus. An anti-Messiah, known in Muslim apocalyptic literature as Dajjal, will come from the Khorasan region of eastern Iran and kill a vast number of the caliphate’s fighters, until just 5,000 remain, cornered in Jerusalem. Just as Dajjal prepares to finish them off, Jesus—the second-most-revered prophet in Islam—will return to Earth, spear Dajjal, and lead the Muslims to victory.
赛兰托尼奥说，大比丘战役之后，哈里发国将继续扩张，攻陷伊斯坦布尔。有人认为它将占领整个地球，但赛兰托尼奥认为它不会越过博斯普鲁斯海峡。一位反救世主的人物，这在穆斯林有关末日决战的作品中称为达加尔，他会从伊朗东部的呼罗珊地区过来，杀死大量的哈里发战士，直到只剩下5000人，围困在耶路撒冷。正当达加尔准备消灭他们的时候，伊斯兰教中第二最受尊敬的先知，尔撒（即耶稣），将重归地球，刺死达加尔，然后率领穆斯林取得胜利。
“Only God knows” whether the Islamic State’s armies are the ones foretold, Cerantonio said. But he is hopeful. “The Prophet said that one sign of the imminent arrival of the End of Days is that people will for a long while stop talking about the End of Days,” he said. “If you go to the mosques now, you’ll find the preachers are silent about this subject.” On this theory, even setbacks dealt to the Islamic State mean nothing, since God has preordained the near-destruction of his people anyway. The Islamic State has its best and worst days ahead of it.
赛兰托尼奥说，唯有真主才知道伊斯兰国的军队是不是上面所说的伊斯兰军。但他依然充满期望。“先知说过，末日降临前的一个迹象就是人们已经很久不再谈论世界末日了，”他说。“如今你去清真寺，阿訇们都对这个问题三缄其口。”按照这个理论，即使伊斯兰国遭受挫败也无所谓，因为反正真主已经设定好了几乎要摧毁所有的信徒。伊斯兰国最好和最坏的日子还都在前头。
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Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was declared caliph by his followers last summer. The establishment of a caliphate awakened large sections of Koranic law that had lain dormant, and required those Muslims who recognized the caliphate to immigrate. (Associated Press)
阿布·巴克尔·巴格达迪去年夏季由追随者宣布为哈里发。哈里发国的成立唤醒了许多沉寂多时的古兰经法律，并要求承认哈里发国的穆斯林迁往该国。（美联社）
战斗
The ideological purity of the Islamic State has one compensating virtue: it allows us to predict some of the group’s actions. Osama bin Laden was seldom predictable. He ended his first television interview cryptically. CNN’s Peter Arnett asked him, “What are your future plans?” Bin Laden replied, “You’ll see them and hear about them in the media, God willing.” By contrast, the Islamic State boasts openly about its plans—not all of them, but enough so that by listening carefully, we can deduce how it intends to govern and expand.
伊斯兰国意识形态的纯洁性有一个好处：可以让我们预测这个团体的某些行为。奥萨马·本·拉登很难预测。他的首次电视采访结束得神神秘秘。CNN的彼得·阿内特问他：“你未来有什么计划？”本·拉登答：“你会在媒体上看到听到的，如真主所愿。”相反地，伊斯兰国公开吹嘘他们的计划——当然不是全部，但如果仔细研究，已经足够推断出它的施政方针和扩张方向。
In London, Choudary and his students provided detailed descriptions of how the Islamic State must conduct its foreign policy, now that it is a caliphate. It has already taken up what Islamic law refers to as “offensive jihad,” the forcible expansion into countries that are ruled by non-Muslims. “Hitherto, we were just defending ourselves,” Choudary said; without a caliphate, offensive jihad is an inapplicable concept. But the waging of war to expand the caliphate is an essential duty of the caliph.
在伦敦，乔达瑞和他的弟子们详细描述了伊斯兰国成为哈里发国之后，应如何实施外交政策。它已经开始进行伊斯兰法所说的“进攻性圣战”，即以武力向非穆斯林统治的国家扩张。“迄今为止，我们还只是在自卫，”乔达瑞说。没有哈里发国，进攻性圣战是一种无法接受的概念。但发动战争扩大哈里发国的疆域是哈里发的基本职责之一。
Choudary took pains to present the laws of war under which the Islamic State operates as policies of mercy rather than of brutality. He told me the state has an obligation to terrorize its enemies—a holy order to scare the shit out of them with beheadings and crucifixions and enslavement of women and children, because doing so hastens victory and avoids prolonged conflict.
乔达瑞绞尽脑汁地把伊斯兰国实施的战时法律描绘成德政，而非暴政。他告诉我伊斯兰国有责任威慑敌人——斩首、钉十字架和将妇孺充奴都是把敌人吓得屁滚尿流的圣令，因为这么做会加速胜利的到来，避免长时间的冲突。
Choudary’s colleague Abu Baraa explained that Islamic law permits only temporary peace treaties, lasting no longer than a decade. Similarly, accepting any border is anathema, as stated by the Prophet and echoed in the Islamic State’s propaganda videos. If the caliph consents to a longer-term peace or permanent border, he will be in error. Temporary peace treaties are renewable, but may not be applied to all enemies at once: the caliph must wage jihad at least once a year. He may not rest, or he will fall into a state of sin.
乔达瑞的同事阿布·巴拉阿解释说，伊斯兰法仅仅允许暂时性的和平条约，为时不得超过十年。与此类似，正如先知所言，接受任何边界划分也是要被逐出教门的，这一点在伊斯兰国的宣传视频中也有反映。如果哈里发批准任何长期和约或者永久边界划分，那么他就犯了错误。暂时性的和约可以续期，但不可与所有敌人同时续期；哈里发每年必须至少发动一次圣战。他不得休憩，否则就是堕入了有罪的状态。
One comparison to the Islamic State is the Khmer Rouge, which killed about a third of the population of Cambodia. But the Khmer Rouge occupied Cambodia’s seat at the United Nations. “This is not permitted,” Abu Baraa said. “To send an ambassador to the UN is to recognize an authority other than God’s.” This form of diplomacy is shirk, or polytheism, he argued, and would be immediate cause to hereticize and replace Baghdadi. Even to hasten the arrival of a caliphate by democratic means—for example by voting for political candidates who favor a caliphate—is shirk.
一个可以和伊斯兰国相提并论的政权是红色高棉，它屠杀了柬埔寨大约三分之一的人口。但红色高棉在联合国占有一席之地。“这是不允许的，”阿布·巴拉阿说。“向联合国派驻大使就是认同真主之外的权威。”他指出，这种外交形式是偶像崇拜，或信仰多神，会立刻使巴格达迪成为异端并被替换。即使用民主的方式加速哈里发国的降临，比如投票选举支持哈里发国的政治候选人，也是偶像崇拜。
It’s hard to overstate how hamstrung the Islamic State will be by its radicalism. The modern international system, born of the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, relies on each state’s willingness to recognize borders, however grudgingly. For the Islamic State, that recognition is ideological suicide. Other Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, have succumbed to the blandishments of democracy and the potential for an invitation to the community of nations, complete with a UN seat. Negotiation and accommodation have worked, at times, for the Taliban as well. (Under Taliban rule, Afghanistan exchanged ambassadors with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates, an act that invalidated the Taliban’s authority in the Islamic State’s eyes.) To the Islamic State these are not options, but acts of apostasy.
对伊斯兰国激进主义的破坏性怎么说都不过分。现代国家体系诞生于1648年的威斯特伐利亚和约，其基础是各国无论多么不情愿，也要尊重边界划分。对伊斯兰国来说，这种尊重与其意识形态格格不入。其他伊斯兰主义的团体，比如穆斯林兄弟会和哈马斯，都接受了众人的劝导，渴望受邀加入国际大家庭，最终获得联合国的席位。即使是塔利班，谈判和迁就也时不时奏效。（塔利班统治下的阿富汗与沙特阿拉伯、巴基斯坦及阿联酋互派了大使，这一举动使伊斯兰国认为塔利班政权非法。）在伊斯兰国看来，这些都不可以做，是叛教行为。
The United States and its allies have reacted to the Islamic State belatedly and in an apparent daze. The group’s ambitions and rough strategic blueprints were evident in its pronouncements and in social-media chatter as far back as 2011, when it was just one of many terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq and hadn’t yet committed mass atrocities. Adnani, the spokesman, told followers then that the group’s ambition was to “restore the Islamic caliphate,” and he evoked the apocalypse, saying, “There are but a few days left.” Baghdadi had already styled himself “commander of the faithful,” a title ordinarily reserved for caliphs, in 2011. In April 2013, Adnani declared the movement “ready to redraw the world upon the Prophetic methodology of the caliphate.” In August 2013, he said, “Our goal is to establish an Islamic state that doesn’t recognize borders, on the Prophetic methodology.” By then, the group had taken Raqqa, a Syrian provincial capital of perhaps 500,000 people, and was drawing in substantial numbers of foreign fighters who’d heard its message.
美国及其盟国对伊斯兰国的反应既迟钝又迷茫。这个团体的野心及粗略的战略蓝图早在2011年就已在其通告和社交媒体的发言中相当明显。当时它只是叙利亚和伊拉克为数众多的恐怖组织之一，还没有犯下大规模的暴行。发言人阿德纳尼当时告诉追随者们，这个团体的目标就是要“重建伊斯兰哈里发国，”他也谈到末日决战，说，“已经为时不远了。”2011年巴格达迪就已经把自己塑造成“信者的领袖”，这通常是留给哈里发的称谓。2013年4月，阿德纳尼宣布开始“准备着，以先知的哈里发国方式重划世界”运动。2013年8月，他说：“我们的目标是以先知的方式建立一个不承认任何国界的伊斯兰国家。”此时该组织已经占领叙利亚的一个省府拉卡，当地人口约50万，并不断吸引着大量听到召唤的外国斗士。
If we had identified the Islamic State’s intentions early, and realized that the vacuum in Syria and Iraq would give it ample space to carry them out, we might, at a minimum, have pushed Iraq to harden its border with Syria and preemptively make deals with its Sunnis. That would at least have avoided the electrifying propaganda effect created by the declaration of a caliphate just after the conquest of Iraq’s third-largest city. Yet, just over a year ago, Obama told The New Yorker that he considered ISIS to be al-Qaeda’s weaker partner. “If a jayvee team puts on Lakers uniforms that doesn’t make them Kobe Bryant,” the president said.
如果我们能够早点确定伊斯兰国的企图，并看出叙利亚和伊拉克的真空地带会给它实现自己的企图提供广阔的空间，我们至少能够推动伊拉克强化它与叙利亚的边界，并采取预防措施，与国内的逊尼派达成妥协。这起码可以避免在攻克伊拉克第三大城市后宣布成立哈里发国所带来的震撼性宣传效应。可惜，就在一年多前，奥巴马还对《纽约客》说，他认为ISIS只是基地组织的小伙伴。总统说：“让大学球队套上湖人队服，也成不了科比。”
Our failure to appreciate the split between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, and the essential differences between the two, has led to dangerous decisions. Last fall, to take one example, the U.S. government consented to a desperate plan to save Peter Kassig’s life. The plan facilitated—indeed, required—the interaction of some of the founding figures of the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, and could hardly have looked more hastily improvised.
我们未能看出伊斯兰国和基地组织的分裂，也未能分清二者的根本区别，这已经导致了危险的决策。比如，去年秋天，美国政府批准了一个营救彼得·卡西格的铤而走险计划。其中居然包含，应该说是要求，与一些伊斯兰国和基地组织的奠基人接触，这是何等仓促草率。
Given everything we know about the Islamic State, continuing to slowly bleed it appears the best of bad military options.
根据我们所了解的伊斯兰国的一切，让它慢慢流血似乎是无奈之中最好的办法。
It entailed the enlistment of Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi, the Zarqawi mentor and al-Qaeda grandee, to approach Turki al-Binali, the Islamic State’s chief ideologue and a former student of Maqdisi’s, even though the two men had fallen out due to Maqdisi’s criticism of the Islamic State. Maqdisi had already called for the state to extend mercy to Alan Henning, the British cabbie who had entered Syria to deliver aid to children. In December, The Guardian reported that the U.S. government, through an intermediary, had asked Maqdisi to intercede with the Islamic State on Kassig’s behalf.
这个计划需要动用阿布·穆罕默德·马克迪斯，就是那个扎卡维及基地组织高层的导师。让他接触伊斯兰国的意识形态主管图尔基·比纳利，他以前也是马克迪斯的弟子，虽然二人已经由于马克迪斯对伊斯兰国的批评不欢而散。马克迪斯当时也已经呼吁伊斯兰国宽恕英国出租司机阿兰·亨宁，他去叙利亚只是运送儿童援助物资。12月，《卫报》报道，美国政府通过中间人请求马克迪斯阻止伊斯兰国杀害卡西格。
Maqdisi was living freely in Jordan, but had been banned from communicating with terrorists abroad, and was being monitored closely. After Jordan granted the United States permission to reintroduce Maqdisi to Binali, Maqdisi bought a phone with American money and was allowed to correspond merrily with his former student for a few days, before the Jordanian government stopped the chats and used them as a pretext to jail Maqdisi. Kassig’s severed head appeared in the Dabiq video a few days later.
马克迪斯当时在约旦自由生活，但不得与国外的恐怖分子联系，而且受到严密监视。约旦允许美国让马克迪斯联系比纳利。马克迪斯用美国人的钱买了一个电话，与他以前的学生愉快地交流了几天，然后约旦政府就中止了这种联系，并以此为借口逮捕了马克迪斯。几天后，卡西格斩下的头颅出现在大比丘的视频中。
Maqdisi gets mocked roundly on Twitter by the Islamic State’s fans, and alQaeda is held in great contempt for refusing to acknowledge the caliphate. Cole Bunzel, a scholar who studies Islamic State ideology, read Maqdisi’s opinion on Henning’s status and thought it would hasten his and other captives’ death. “If I were held captive by the Islamic State and Maqdisi said I shouldn’t be killed,” he told me, “I’d kiss my ass goodbye.”
马克迪斯在推特上遭到伊斯兰国粉丝的无情嘲讽，基地组织也因拒不承认哈里发国被严重鄙视。研究伊斯兰国意识形态的学者科尔·布恩泽读过马克迪斯在亨宁问题上的意见后认为他加速了亨宁及其他人质的死亡。“如果我被捕成为伊斯兰国的人质，然后马克迪斯说我不应该被杀，”他告诉我说，“那我就可以跟自己说拜拜了。”
Kassig’s death was a tragedy, but the plan’s success would have been a bigger one. A reconciliation between Maqdisi and Binali would have begun to heal the main rift between the world’s two largest jihadist organizations. It’s possible that the government wanted only to draw out Binali for intelligence purposes or assassination. (Multiple attempts to elicit comment from the FBI were unsuccessful.) Regardless, the decision to play matchmaker for America’s two main terrorist antagonists reveals astonishingly poor judgment.
卡西格的死是个悲剧，但那个计划本来可以更成功。马克迪斯和比纳利的和解本来可以开始弥合世界两个最大的圣战组织之间的裂痕。政府本来可以只是把比纳利引出来，获取情报或者除掉。（多次联系FBI都未获回应。）无论如何，企图在美国两个主要的恐怖对手之间扮演媒婆角色只能表明判断力奇差！
Chastened by our earlier indifference, we are now meeting the Islamic State via Kurdish and Iraqi proxy on the battlefield, and with regular air assaults. Those strategies haven’t dislodged the Islamic State from any of its major territorial possessions, although they’ve kept it from directly assaulting Baghdad and Erbil and slaughtering Shia and Kurds there.
我们前期后知后觉的恶果，就是我们现在只能通过库尔德和伊拉克的代理在战场上面对伊斯兰国，然后辅以定期的空袭。这种战术没有改变伊斯兰国控制的任何主要疆域，只能阻止他们直接攻打巴格达和阿尔比尔，到那里去屠杀什叶派民众和库尔德人。
Some observers have called for escalation, including several predictable voices from the interventionist right (Max Boot, Frederick Kagan), who have urged the deployment of tens of thousands of American soldiers. These calls should not be dismissed too quickly: an avowedly genocidal organization is on its potential victims’ front lawn, and it is committing daily atrocities in the territory it already controls.
某些观察家要求行动升级，可以想见，其中包括来自偏右的干涉主义者的声音（马克斯·布特，弗里德里克·卡甘），他们一直敦促部署成千上万的美国部队。这种声音不应立即驳回，因为那个公然进行种族屠杀的组织已经到了受害者的家门口，每天都在其控制的地区犯下暴行。
One way to un-cast the Islamic State’s spell over its adherents would be to overpower it militarily and occupy the parts of Syria and Iraq now under caliphate rule. AlQaeda is ineradicable because it can survive, cockroach-like, by going underground. The Islamic State cannot. If it loses its grip on its territory in Syria and Iraq, it will cease to be a caliphate. Caliphates cannot exist as underground movements, because territorial authority is a requirement: take away its command of territory, and all those oaths of allegiance are no longer binding. Former pledges could of course continue to attack the West and behead their enemies, as freelancers. But the propaganda value of the caliphate would disappear, and with it the supposed religious duty to immigrate and serve it. If the United States were to invade, the Islamic State’s obsession with battle at Dabiq suggests that it might send vast resources there, as if in a conventional battle. If the state musters at Dabiq in full force, only to be routed, it might never recover.
摧毁伊斯兰国凝聚力的一种方法是在军事上战胜它，并占领目前被哈里发国统治的叙利亚和伊拉克地区。基地组织难以根除是因为它可以转入地下，像蟑螂一样继续生存。伊斯兰国不行。如果它失去对叙利亚和伊拉克的领土控制，就不能再作为哈里发国存在。哈里发国不能作为地下运动存在，因为拥有领土是必要条件：一旦去除它对领土的控制，那些效忠的誓言就不再有效。当然那些以前的效忠者可以继续攻击西方，斩首敌人，但只能各自行事。哈里发国的宣传价值也将烟消云散，同时消散的还有向其迁移及为其效劳的宗教责任。如果美国发动地面进攻，伊斯兰国对大比丘之战的偏执会导致其投入巨大的资源，打一场常规战争。如果它在大比丘投入全力，而且被打败，它永远无法复原。
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Abu Baraa, who maintains a YouTube channel about Islamic law, says the caliph, Baghdadi, cannot negotiate or recognize borders, and must continually make war, or he will remove himself from Islam.
阿布·巴拉阿，在油管上维护着一个关于伊斯兰法的频道，说哈里发巴格达迪不得谈判约定边界，而且必须不断发动战争，否则会被逐出教门。
And yet the risks of escalation are enormous. The biggest proponent of an American invasion is the Islamic State itself. The provocative videos, in which a black-hooded executioner addresses President Obama by name, are clearly made to draw America into the fight. An invasion would be a huge propaganda victory for jihadists worldwide: irrespective of whether they have given baya’a to the caliph, they all believe that the United States wants to embark on a modern-day Crusade and kill Muslims. Yet another invasion and occupation would confirm that suspicion, and bolster recruitment. Add the incompetence of our previous efforts as occupiers, and we have reason for reluctance. The rise of ISIS, after all, happened only because our previous occupation created space for Zarqawi and his followers. Who knows the consequences of another botched job?
问题是，战争升级的风险十分巨大。鼓动美国发动地面进攻最积极的就是伊斯兰国本身。戴着黑头套的行刑者咒骂奥巴马总统的挑衅性视频显然意在将美国拉进战争。地面进攻将是全世界圣战者的巨大宣传胜利：无论他们是否已经对哈里发表示拜伊尔（效忠），但都相信美国要发动一场现代的十字军战争，屠杀穆斯林。地面进攻和占领会证实这种说法，从而促进其人员招募。加上以前作为占领军的不良记录，我们有理由犹疑。毕竟ISIS的崛起正是由于我们以前的占领行动为扎卡维及其追随者创造了空间。谁知道另一场拙劣的行动会有什么后果？
Given everything we know about the Islamic State, continuing to slowly bleed it, through air strikes and proxy warfare, appears the best of bad military options. Neither the Kurds nor the Shia will ever subdue and control the whole Sunni heartland of Syria and Iraq—they are hated there, and have no appetite for such an adventure anyway. But they can keep the Islamic State from fulfilling its duty to expand. And with every month that it fails to expand, it resembles less the conquering state of the Prophet Muhammad than yet another Middle Eastern government failing to bring prosperity to its people.
根据我们所了解的伊斯兰国的一切，通过空袭和代理人战争让它慢慢流血似乎是无奈之中的最好办法。库尔德人和什叶派民众都永远不会屈服，也永远不能控制叙利亚和伊拉克所有的逊尼派中心区域——他们在那里被人憎恨，再说也没有这种企图。但他们可以阻止伊斯兰国完成扩张的职责。它成年累月地无法扩张，就会越来越不像先知穆罕默德的胜利国度，而只会越来越像另一个无法给人民带来福祉的中东政府。
The humanitarian cost of the Islamic State’s existence is high. But its threat to the United States is smaller than its all too frequent conflation with al-Qaeda would suggest. Al-Qaeda’s core is rare among jihadist groups for its focus on the “far enemy” (the West); most jihadist groups’ main concerns lie closer to home. That’s especially true of the Islamic State, precisely because of its ideology. It sees enemies everywhere around it, and while its leadership wishes ill on the United States, the application of Sharia in the caliphate and the expansion to contiguous lands are paramount. Baghdadi has said as much directly: in November he told his Saudi agents to “deal with the rafida [Shia] first … then al-Sulul [Sunni supporters of the Saudi monarchy] … before the crusaders and their bases.”
伊斯兰国存在的人道主义成本十分高昂。虽然它常常与基地组织相提并论，但对美国的威胁却不那么大。基地组织的战略核心在圣战组织中比较罕见，是集中在“远方的敌人”（即西方），而大多数圣战组织的主要目标是在附近。伊斯兰国更是如此，这正是因为它的意识形态：它认为周围都是敌人。虽然它的领袖也对美国心怀敌意，但在哈里发国施行沙利亚法并不断扩大疆土才是第一位的。巴格达迪对此几乎直言：11月他告诉他沙特的代理人，“首先对付拉菲塔（即什叶派）……然后是苏鲁勒（即沙特王国的逊尼支持者）……然后才是十字军和他们的基地。”
Musa Cerantonio and Anjem Choudary could mentally shift from contemplating mass death to discussing the virtues of Vietnamese coffee, with apparent delight in each.
穆萨·赛兰托尼奥和安杰姆·乔达瑞的头脑既可以思考大屠杀，又可以讨论越南咖啡的特色，而且显然从二者都能感到愉悦。
The foreign fighters (and their wives and children) have been traveling to the caliphate on one-way tickets: they want to live under true Sharia, and many want martyrdom. Doctrine, recall, requires believers to reside in the caliphate if it is at all possible for them to do so. One of the Islamic State’s less bloody videos shows a group of jihadists burning their French, British, and Australian passports. This would be an eccentric act for someone intending to return to blow himself up in line at the Louvre or to hold another chocolate shop hostage in Sydney.
外籍斗士（以及他们的老婆孩子）拿着单程票奔赴哈里发国：他们希望在真正的沙利亚法下生活，许多还希望成为烈士。记得吧，教义要求真正的信徒必须尽一切可能在哈里发国境内居住。一段伊斯兰国不大血腥的视频播放了一群圣战斗士烧毁他们的法国、英国，及澳大利亚护照的画面。这对那些有意回去在卢浮宫的参观人龙中引爆自杀炸弹和在悉尼劫持巧克力店的人来说肯定不可思议。
A few “lone wolf” supporters of the Islamic State have attacked Western targets, and more attacks will come. But most of the attackers have been frustrated amateurs, unable to immigrate to the caliphate because of confiscated passports or other problems. Even if the Islamic State cheers these attacks—and it does in its propaganda—it hasn’t yet planned and financed one. (The Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris in January was principally an alQaeda operation.) During his visit to Mosul in December, Jürgen Todenhöfer interviewed a portly German jihadist and asked whether any of his comrades had returned to Europe to carry out attacks. The jihadist seemed to regard returnees not as soldiers but as dropouts. “The fact is that the returnees from the Islamic State should repent from their return,” he said. “I hope they review their religion.”
伊斯兰国的一些“独狼型”的支持者攻击了西方目标，而且还陆续有来。但大多数攻击者都是业余水平的失意者，他们由于护照被没收或者其他原因未能迁往哈里发国。虽然伊斯兰国欢呼这些攻击，它的宣传机器就是这么干的，但它还没有策划或资助过任何一起。（一月份对《查理周刊》的攻击原则上是一次基地组织的操作。）尤根·托登霍夫12月走访摩苏尔时，曾采访一位身形富态的德国圣战者，询问他有没有同伙曾回到欧洲发动袭击。这位圣战者似乎认为回去的不是战士，而是辍学生。“实际上那些从伊斯兰国回去的人应该感到后悔，”他说。“我希望他们重新检视自己的宗教信仰。”
Properly contained, the Islamic State is likely to be its own undoing. No country is its ally, and its ideology ensures that this will remain the case. The land it controls, while expansive, is mostly uninhabited and poor. As it stagnates or slowly shrinks, its claim that it is the engine of God’s will and the agent of apocalypse will weaken, and fewer believers will arrive. And as more reports of misery within it leak out, radical Islamist movements elsewhere will be discredited: No one has tried harder to implement strict Sharia by violence. This is what it looks like.
只要控制得当，伊斯兰国很可能自我毁灭。任何国家都不会是它的盟友，而且它的意识形态也确保这种状况不会改变。它控制的疆域虽然在扩大，但大都不适宜居住，又贫瘠不堪。它自称代表真主意志，而且是末日决战的使者。一旦其疆域停止扩张，或者缩小，这种说法就会弱化，迁来的信徒就会减少。随着其内部惨况的报道逐渐被披露，其他地方的激进伊斯兰主义运动也会丧失信誉：这是最尽力用暴力严格施行沙利亚法的国家，它不过是这个样子。
Even so, the death of the Islamic State is unlikely to be quick, and things could still go badly wrong: if the Islamic State obtained the allegiance of alQaeda—increasing, in one swoop, the unity of its base—it could wax into a worse foe than we’ve yet seen. The rift between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda has, if anything, grown in the past few months; the December issue of Dabiq featured a long account of an alQaeda defector who described his old group as corrupt and ineffectual, and Zawahiri as a distant and unfit leader. But we should watch carefully for a rapprochement.
即使如此，伊斯兰国的灭亡不会一蹴而就，而且情况还有可能变得非常糟糕：如果伊斯兰国获得基地组织的效忠——从而大幅提高其基本信众的团结——它可能成为一个前所未见的最强大对手。伊斯兰国和基地组织的裂痕在过去几个月中似乎有所加深；12月份的《大比丘》发表了一大篇对一位基地组织投诚者的采访，他形容老东家腐败无能，扎瓦希里高高在上，不适合当领袖。但我们应该小心观察，双方万一和解了呢？
Without a catastrophe such as this, however, or perhaps the threat of the Islamic State’s storming Erbil, a vast ground invasion would certainly make the situation worse.
除非发生这样的变故，或者出现伊斯兰国进攻阿尔比尔的威胁，大规模的地面进攻肯定只会让局面恶化。
攻心
It would be facile, even exculpatory, to call the problem of the Islamic State “a problem with Islam.” The religion allows many interpretations, and Islamic State supporters are morally on the hook for the one they choose. And yet simply denouncing the Islamic State as un-Islamic can be counterproductive, especially if those who hear the message have read the holy texts and seen the endorsement of many of the caliphate’s practices written plainly within them.
把伊斯兰国的问题称作“伊斯兰的问题”是肤浅的，甚至有为其开脱的嫌疑。伊斯兰教可以有许多不同的解读，而伊斯兰国的支持者们只是在道义上执着于其中一种。同时，简单地指责伊斯兰国不是伊斯兰也毫无意义，特别是对于那些读过古兰经原文的人，他们见到哈里发国行为的根据，都明明白白地写在经书当中。
Muslims can say that slavery is not legitimate now, and that crucifixion is wrong at this historical juncture. Many say precisely this. But they cannot condemn slavery or crucifixion outright without contradicting the Koran and the example of the Prophet. “The only principled ground that the Islamic State’s opponents could take is to say that certain core texts and traditional teachings of Islam are no longer valid,” Bernard Haykel says. That really would be an act of apostasy.
穆斯林可以说现在奴隶制已经不合法，或者钉十字架在目前这个历史时期是错误的。很多人的确是这么说的。但他们无法直言不讳地谴责蓄奴或者钉十字架，否则他们将与古兰经和先知的榜样发生冲突。“伊斯兰国的反对者只能采取一种原则立场，即伊斯兰教的某些核心经文和传统训导已经不再有效，”伯纳德·海克尔说。但这本身，就已经是一种叛教的举动。
The Islamic State’s ideology exerts powerful sway over a certain subset of the population. Life’s hypocrisies and inconsistencies vanish in its face. Musa Cerantonio and the Salafis I met in London are unstumpable: no question I posed left them stuttering. They lectured me garrulously and, if one accepts their premises, convincingly. To call them un-Islamic appears, to me, to invite them into an argument that they would win. If they had been froth-spewing maniacs, I might be able to predict that their movement would burn out as the psychopaths detonated themselves or became drone-splats, one by one. But these men spoke with an academic precision that put me in mind of a good graduate seminar. I even enjoyed their company, and that frightened me as much as anything else.
伊斯兰国的意识形态对某一特定的人群可以有强大的支配力。生活中的虚伪与表里不一在它面前消失得无影无踪。穆萨·赛兰托尼奥以及我在伦敦见过的萨拉菲教徒让人难以抗拒：我提出的问题他们回答起来连磕巴都不打。他们对我的反复说教，如果接受他们设定的前提，反而很有说服力。把他们称作非穆斯林，对我来说，似乎是邀请他们来一场他们一定会赢的辩论。如果他们只是口沫横飞的疯子，我就可以断言他们将自我毁灭，因为疯子一个一个地不是自己绑上炸弹爆炸，就是成为无人机下的肉酱。但这些人的言论学术精准，使我恍如身处高水平的学术交流。我甚至有些享受与他们相处，这让我不寒而栗。
Non-muslims cannot tell Muslims how to practice their religion properly. But Muslims have long since begun this debate within their own ranks. “You have to have standards,” Anjem Choudary told me. “Somebody could claim to be a Muslim, but if he believes in homosexuality or drinking alcohol, then he is not a Muslim. There is no such thing as a nonpracticing vegetarian.”
非穆斯林无法教导穆斯林如何正确地信奉自己的宗教。但穆斯林内部这个问题已经争论了很久很久。“你得有套标准，”乔达瑞告诉我。“人人都可以自称是穆斯林，但如果有人接受同性恋或者喝酒，那他就不是穆斯林。这就好像不会有吃荤的素食者一样。”
There is, however, another strand of Islam that offers a hard-line alternative to the Islamic State—just as uncompromising, but with opposite conclusions. This strand has proved appealing to many Muslims cursed or blessed with a psychological longing to see every jot and tittle of the holy texts implemented as they were in the earliest days of Islam. Islamic State supporters know how to react to Muslims who ignore parts of the Koran: with takfir and ridicule. But they also know that some other Muslims read the Koran as assiduously as they do, and pose a real ideological threat.
可是，伊斯兰还有一个派别，和伊斯兰国同样属强硬派，他们也决不妥协，但结论却与伊斯兰国完全相反。不知是福还是祸，有些穆斯林心理上渴望看到在生活中像伊斯兰早期那样贯彻经文中的每个细节。对于这些人来说，这个派别很有吸引力。伊斯兰国知道如何对付那些忽略部分古兰经内容的穆斯林：实行塔克菲尔（即逐出教门），或者讽刺嘲笑。但他们也知道，还有一些穆斯林，和他们一样，一丝不苟地阅读古兰经，并对他们形成意识形态的威胁。
Baghdadi is Salafi. The term Salafi has been villainized, in part because authentic villains have ridden into battle waving the Salafi banner. But most Salafis are not jihadists, and most adhere to sects that reject the Islamic State. They are, as Haykel notes, committed to expanding Dar al-Islam, the land of Islam, even, perhaps, with the implementation of monstrous practices such as slavery and amputation—but at some future point. Their first priority is personal purification and religious observance, and they believe anything that thwarts those goals—such as causing war or unrest that would disrupt lives and prayer and scholarship—is forbidden.
巴格达迪是萨拉菲派信徒。萨拉菲这个词名声不好，部分原因是确有恶棍曾挥舞着萨拉菲派的旗帜为非作歹。但大多数萨拉菲派信徒不是圣战者，他们大多数所属的宗派都拒绝伊斯兰国。海克尔指出，他们致力于扩大“达拉伊斯兰”，即伊斯兰教的疆域。这也许会使用奴隶制和斩首这样的可怕手段，但那是未来的事情。他们的首要任务是个人净化和严格奉行宗教，任何妨碍这个目标的事情——比如导致战乱而残害生命、干扰祈祷或打搅经文研习——都是不允许的。
They live among us. Last fall, I visited the Philadelphia mosque of Breton Pocius, 28, a Salafi imam who goes by the name Abdullah. His mosque is on the border between the crime-ridden Northern Liberties neighborhood and a gentrifying area that one might call Dar al-Hipster; his beard allows him to pass in the latter zone almost unnoticed.
他们就在我们身边。去年秋天，我到费城的一家清真寺拜访了一名28岁的萨拉菲派伊玛目布雷顿·博休斯，教名阿卜杜拉。他的清真寺一边是费城罪案丛生的自由北区，另一边是个高档社区，可以称作“达拉潮人”（潮人区）。他的胡子样式可以让他在这个潮人区随意走动而毫无违和感。
Pocius converted 15 years ago after a Polish Catholic upbringing in Chicago. Like Cerantonio, he talks like an old soul, exhibiting deep familiarity with ancient texts, and a commitment to them motivated by curiosity and scholarship, and by a conviction that they are the only way to escape hellfire. When I met him at a local coffee shop, he carried a work of Koranic scholarship in Arabic and a book for teaching himself Japanese. He was preparing a sermon on the obligations of fatherhood for the 150 or so worshipers in his Friday congregation.
博休斯来自芝加哥的波兰裔天主教家庭，15年前皈依伊斯兰教。和赛兰托尼奥一样，他说起话来像个老者，对古老的经文滚瓜烂熟，又因求知欲和学识丰富对其笃信不移。他坚信经文是逃脱火狱的唯一途径。我和他在当地的一家咖啡馆见面时，他带着一本阿拉伯文的古兰经研习著作，还有一本自学用的日语书。他正在准备周五主麻（穆斯林周五中午的礼拜聚会为一周最隆重，称为“主麻”）有关父道的讲经，对象是150个左右信徒。
Pocius said his main goal is to encourage a halal life for worshipers in his mosque. But the rise of the Islamic State has forced him to consider political questions that are usually very far from the minds of Salafis. “Most of what they’ll say about how to pray and how to dress is exactly what I’ll say in my masjid [mosque]. But when they get to questions about social upheaval, they sound like Che Guevara.”
博休斯说自己的主要任务是鼓励自己寺中的信徒生活严格清真。但伊斯兰国的崛起迫使他考虑政治问题，这本来对萨拉菲信众来说遥不可及。“他们有关着装和礼拜的说法与我在自己寺中讲的一模一样。但一说到社会动乱，他们的口气就像切·格拉瓦了。”
When Baghdadi showed up, Pocius adopted the slogan “Not my khalifa.” “The times of the Prophet were a time of great bloodshed,” he told me, “and he knew that the worst possible condition for all people was chaos, especially within the umma [Muslim community].” Accordingly, Pocius said, the correct attitude for Salafis is not to sow discord by factionalizing and declaring fellow Muslims apostates.
巴格达迪一出现，博休斯就喊出“这不是我的哈里发”的口号。“先知所处的年代是大浴血的时代，”他告诉我，“他知道人们最坏的境况是动荡，特别是在乌玛（穆斯林社会）内部。”因此，博休斯说，萨拉菲信众的正确态度不是煽动不和，宣布其他穆斯林为叛教者。
Instead, Pocius—like a majority of Salafis—believes that Muslims should remove themselves from politics. These quietist Salafis, as they are known, agree with the Islamic State that God’s law is the only law, and they eschew practices like voting and the creation of political parties. But they interpret the Koran’s hatred of discord and chaos as requiring them to fall into line with just about any leader, including some manifestly sinful ones. “The Prophet said: as long as the ruler does not enter into clear kufr [disbelief], give him general obedience,” Pocius told me, and the classic “books of creed” all warn against causing social upheaval. Quietist Salafis are strictly forbidden from dividing Muslims from one another—for example, by mass excommunication. Living without baya’a, Pocius said, does indeed make one ignorant, or benighted. But baya’a need not mean direct allegiance to a caliph, and certainly not to Abu Bakr al‑Baghdadi. It can mean, more broadly, allegiance to a religious social contract and commitment to a society of Muslims, whether ruled by a caliph or not.
相反地，博休斯与大多数萨拉菲派信众一样，相信穆斯林应远离政治。他们被称为寂静主义萨拉菲派，与伊斯兰国一样，也承认真主的法律唯一，并回避创建政党或投票之类的事务。但他们把古兰经对不和与动荡的厌恶解读成自己可以服从任何领袖，即使对方明显是有罪之人。“先知说过：只要统治者没有明确的卡菲勒（不信道）行为，服从他，”博休斯告诉我，经典的“圣训集”也都警告过不可造成社会动乱。寂静主义萨拉菲信徒决不允许分裂穆斯林——比如用大规模逐出教门的方式。博休斯说，生活中没有拜伊尔（效忠）的确让人无知，或陷入黑暗。但拜伊尔并不是对一个哈里发直接表示效忠，更不是对阿布·巴克尔·巴格达迪。它可以，更广义来说，是对宗教性社会契约的效忠，或者是对穆斯林社会的奉献，不用考虑是否在哈里发统治之下。
Quietist Salafis believe that Muslims should direct their energies toward perfecting their personal life, including prayer, ritual, and hygiene. Much in the same way ultra-Orthodox Jews debate whether it’s kosher to tear off squares of toilet paper on the Sabbath (does that count as “rending cloth”?), they spend an inordinate amount of time ensuring that their trousers are not too long, that their beards are trimmed in some areas and shaggy in others. Through this fastidious observance, they believe, God will favor them with strength and numbers, and perhaps a caliphate will arise. At that moment, Muslims will take vengeance and, yes, achieve glorious victory at Dabiq. But Pocius cites a slew of modern Salafi theologians who argue that a caliphate cannot come into being in a righteous way except through the unmistakable will of God.
寂静主义萨拉菲信徒认为穆斯林应该将精力放在个人修行上，包括礼拜、仪式、及卫生。这与超正统的犹太教徒类似，后者曾辩论安息日扯断厕所卷纸是否符合犹太教规（这算不算“撕开布匹”？- 译注：撕开布匹属正统犹太教安息日39种禁忌行为之一）。寂静萨拉菲教徒花大量时间确保裤子长度合适，哪些地方的胡子必须修剪整齐，哪些地方必须保持蓬松。他们相信，通过这些挑剔讲究的繁文缛节，真主会眷顾他们，赐予他们力量，保佑他们繁衍壮大，没准还会带来哈里发的崛起。到那时候，穆斯林才展开复仇，是的，就是在大比丘取得光荣的胜利。但博休斯引述一大段某位现代萨拉菲神学家的观点，说如果真主没有表示明确无疑的意愿，不会有正当的哈里发国诞生。
The Islamic State, of course, would agree, and say that God has anointed Baghdadi. Pocius’s retort amounts to a call to humility. He cites Abdullah Ibn Abbas, one of the Prophet’s companions, who sat down with dissenters and asked them how they had the gall, as a minority, to tell the majority that it was wrong. Dissent itself, to the point of bloodshed or splitting the umma, was forbidden. Even the manner of the establishment of Baghdadi’s caliphate runs contrary to expectation, he said. “The khilafa is something that Allah is going to establish,” he told me, “and it will involve a consensus of scholars from Mecca and Medina. That is not what happened. ISIS came out of nowhere.”
伊斯兰国当然认为真主已经选定了巴格达迪。博休斯的反驳已经成了一种侮辱。博休斯讲述先知的同伴阿卜杜拉·伊本·阿巴斯的故事，阿卜杜拉和叛军坐在一起，劝说他们鼓起勇气，作为少数派向多数派承认自己的错误。流血屠杀和分裂乌玛（伊斯兰社会）的异见是不允许的。他说甚至巴格达迪这种建立哈里发国的方式也不符合预期。“哈里发国应该由安拉建立，”他说道，“应该包含麦加麦地那学者的共识。现在的情况并非如此，ISIS不知道是从哪来的。”
The Islamic State loathes this talk, and its fanboys tweet derisively about quietist Salafis. They mock them as “Salafis of menstruation,” for their obscure judgments about when women are and aren’t clean, and other low-priority aspects of life. “What we need now is fatwa about how it’s haram [forbidden] to ride a bike on Jupiter,” one tweeted drily. “That’s what scholars should focus on. More pressing than state of Ummah.” Anjem Choudary, for his part, says that no sin merits more vigorous opposition than the usurpation of God’s law, and that extremism in defense of monotheism is no vice.
伊斯兰国非常讨厌这种说法，它的狂热粉丝在推特上对寂静主义萨拉菲教派毫不留情。他们嘲笑它为“月经萨拉菲派”，因为其对女人何时洁净何时不洁的判定十分奇怪，还有一些其他无关紧要的生活细节。“我们现在需要的是一条禁止女人在木星上骑自行车的教令，”有条推特帖子嘲笑道，“这才是学者们的当务之急，比乌玛国家急得多。”安杰姆·乔达瑞则说篡改真主的法律罪大恶极，应该遭到最激烈的打击，维护真主的唯一，即使激进也没什么不对。
Pocius doesn’t court any kind of official support from the United States, as a counterweight to jihadism. Indeed, official support would tend to discredit him, and in any case he is bitter toward America for treating him, in his words, as “less than a citizen.” (He alleges that the government paid spies to infiltrate his mosque and harassed his mother at work with questions about his being a potential terrorist.)
博休斯不寻求任何美国官方支持其反对圣战。的确，官方支持只会减弱其公信力。他最多也就是抱怨一下美国政府对他，用他的话来说，“不像个公民”。（他声言政府雇佣密探混进他的清真寺，并且在工作场所骚扰他母亲，询问他是不是潜在的恐怖分子。）
Still, his quietist Salafism offers an Islamic antidote to Baghdadi-style jihadism. The people who arrive at the faith spoiling for a fight cannot all be stopped from jihadism, but those whose main motivation is to find an ultraconservative, uncompromising version of Islam have an alternative here. It is not moderate Islam; most Muslims would consider it extreme. It is, however, a form of Islam that the literal-minded would not instantly find hypocritical, or blasphemously purged of its inconveniences. Hypocrisy is not a sin that ideologically minded young men tolerate well.
尽管如此，他的寂静主义萨拉菲教派是一剂针对巴格达迪式圣战运动的伊斯兰良药。仅从一心想战斗的信仰着手，很难让所有人都停止追随圣战，但如果有人想找一个极端保守又决不妥协的教派，它就是一个选择。它并不是一个温和的伊斯兰教派，大多数穆斯林也认为它极端。但它是那种死抠字眼的人觉得不虚伪的伊斯兰派别，而且细节上依然十分繁琐，因此没有不敬。
Western officials would probably do best to refrain from weighing in on matters of Islamic theological debate altogether. Barack Obama himself drifted into takfiri waters when he claimed that the Islamic State was “not Islamic”—the irony being that he, as the non-Muslim son of a Muslim, may himself be classified as an apostate, and yet is now practicing takfir against Muslims. Non-Muslims’ practicing takfir elicits chuckles from jihadists (“Like a pig covered in feces giving hygiene advice to others,” one tweeted).
西方官员也许最好不要涉及任何伊斯兰神学上的争论。巴拉克·奥巴马声称伊斯兰国“不是伊斯兰”的时候，已经滑向塔克菲尔的泥潭——问题在于，他作为穆斯林的儿子却不是穆斯林，这本身就可以被归为叛教。
I suspect that most Muslims appreciated Obama’s sentiment: the president was standing with them against both Baghdadi and non-Muslim chauvinists trying to implicate them in crimes. But most Muslims aren’t susceptible to joining jihad. The ones who are susceptible will only have had their suspicions confirmed: the United States lies about religion to serve its purposes.
我觉得大多数穆斯林都欣赏奥巴马的观点：总统和他们站在一起，既反对巴格达迪，也反对暗示他们有罪的非穆斯林沙文主义者。多数穆斯林并不愿意加入圣战。那些加入圣战的是因为他们证实了如下疑虑：美国在宗教问题上撒谎，以服务自己的目的。
Within the narrow bounds of its theology, the Islamic State hums with energy, even creativity. Outside those bounds, it could hardly be more arid and silent: a vision of life as obedience, order, and destiny. Musa Cerantonio and Anjem Choudary could mentally shift from contemplating mass death and eternal torture to discussing the virtues of Vietnamese coffee or treacly pastry, with apparent delight in each, yet to me it seemed that to embrace their views would be to see all the flavors of this world grow insipid compared with the vivid grotesqueries of the hereafter.
在自己狭隘的神学领域，伊斯兰国精力充沛，创意十足。但在此之外，它枯燥乏味：生活不过是服从、命令和天命。穆萨·赛兰托尼奥与安杰姆·乔达瑞的头脑既可以思考大屠杀和永恒折磨，又可以讨论越南咖啡的特色，或者香甜的点心，而且显然从三者中都能感到愉悦。但在我看来，要同意他们的观点，就得让现世的多姿多彩慢慢消亡，才能达致来世的怪诞绚烂。
I could enjoy their company, as a guilty intellectual exercise, up to a point. In reviewing Mein Kampf in March 1940, George Orwell confessed that he had “never been able to dislike Hitler”; something about the man projected an underdog quality, even when his goals were cowardly or loathsome. “If he were killing a mouse he would know how to make it seem like a dragon.” The Islamic State’s partisans have much the same allure. They believe that they are personally involved in struggles beyond their own lives, and that merely to be swept up in the drama, on the side of righteousness, is a privilege and a pleasure—especially when it is also a burden.
某种程度上，作为一种带有罪恶感的思维运动，我可以享受与他们相处。乔治·奥威尔1940年三月研读《我的奋斗》时，承认自己“根本无法不喜欢希特勒”；这个人即使自己的目标可鄙可憎，也有一种让人觉得高大上的能力。“他即使是在杀只老鼠，也会让你觉得他是在与猛龙搏斗。”伊斯兰国的斗士们也有类似的诱惑。他们坚信自己所处的斗争，意义远在自己生命之外。只要身处正义一方，无声无息地献出生命，特别是在艰难困苦的时刻，是一种荣耀和愉悦。
Fascism, Orwell continued, is
奥威尔继续写道：法西斯主义，
psychologically far sounder than any hedonistic conception of life … Whereas Socialism, and even capitalism in a more grudging way, have said to people “I offer you a good time,” Hitler has said to them, “I offer you struggle, danger, and death,” and as a result a whole nation flings itself at his feet … We ought not to underrate its emotional appeal.
心理上比任何快乐主义的生命哲学都更加明智……社会主义告诉人们：“我会给你们好时光。”甚至资本主义也是不情不愿地这么说着。但希特勒告诉人们：“我给你们斗争、危险和死亡，”结果整个国家都拜倒在他的脚下……我们千万不能低估它的吸引力。
Nor, in the case of the Islamic State, its religious or intellectual appeal. That the Islamic State holds the imminent fulfillment of prophecy as a matter of dogma at least tells us the mettle of our opponent. It is ready to cheer its own near-obliteration, and to remain confident, even when surrounded, that it will receive divine succor if it stays true to the Prophetic model. Ideological tools may convince some potential converts that the group’s message is false, and military tools can limit its horrors. But for an organization as impervious to persuasion as the Islamic State, few measures short of these will matter, and the war may be a long one, even if it doesn’t last until the end of time.
同样我们也不能低估伊斯兰国的宗教和思想吸引力。伊斯兰国以立即实现预言作为自己的信条，这至少能让我们了解这个对手的精神源泉。它即使身处包围圈，也依然信心昂扬，并且可以庆祝自己接近全军覆没。只要保持对先知榜样的真诚，就会获得上天的援助。意识形态上也许能够劝阻部分人相信这个团体说教的虚假性而放弃追随，军事上也许能够控制它的蔓延。但对于像伊斯兰国这样不受说服教育影响的组织，其他手段也是重要的。这是场持久战，虽然不会持续到永远。
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