维基解密：保护既得利益的渴望是中共政治局常委制定决策的主要驱动力

维基解密12月4日公开了美国驻北京大使馆2009年7月23日的电文，内容是由所谓"线人"提供的有关中共中央政治局决策过程的信息。


（以下内容全文翻译自维基解密网站上提供的相关电文）

1.达成共识的需要，以及保护既得利益的渴望，是政治局常委制定决策、以及中国领导人动态的主要驱动力。这是大使馆与领导层有联系的线人提供的信息。

据线人描述，中国党国体制高层内部的关系，与一家大型企业的执行机构接近，是由权力利益的交织互动而决定，或者是由党内元老家族的"太子"们以及那些在党内一层层提拔上来的"掌柜"们之间的竞争为主要特征。

胡锦涛作为董事长？

2.中国共产党政治局的决策制定与一家大型企业的执行机构类似。这是两名与高层联系紧密的线人提供的信息。XXX说，党总书记胡锦涛可被比作一家大企业的董事长。XXX在5月18日与PolOff的会面中也使用了同样的类比。

XXX说，政治局常委的决策正如一家大企业中，谁拥有的股份多，谁的决定权就更大。"胡锦涛持有的股份最多，所以他的看法最有分量，"以此类推，但XXX表示，政治局并不进行正式的投票。"这是一个共识的系统，"他说，"成员可以行使否决权。"
3.XXX此前曾告诉过PolOff，他"有相当权威的信息来源"。"重要的决定"，比如中国对台湾或者朝鲜的核心政策，必须由政治局全体25名成员共同决定。他说，其它更具体的事宜，则由政治局常委9名成员单独决定。有些事务上会进行正式投票，其它的则仅仅是讨论直到达成一致。

XXX讽刺说，无论采取这两种形式中的哪一种，政治局都是"世界上最民主的主体"，是中国唯一一个存在真正民主的地方。XXX说，对于有关说法，即高层中江泽民-上海集团以及胡-温集团之间的阵营平衡，尽管也有"某些"道理，但两个集团都不具有统治地位，重要事务必须由共识决定。

领导层动态：由既得利益驱动

4.XXX在3月12日向PolOff表示，党首先应当被看作是一个利益集团的集合。XXX说，没有"改革派"。在过去一年里，XXX在与 PolOff的多次讨论中也发表同样观点，称中国的高层领导人瓜分了中国的经济蛋糕，形成了一个保守的体系，内中"既得利益"驱动决策的制定，并阻碍改 革，领导人设法确保这些利益不会受到威胁。

XXX说，"很多人都知道"，前总理李鹏及其家族控制了整个电力行业的利益；政治局常委、公安系统的沙皇周永康及其合伙人控制着石油行业的利益；前高层领导人陈云的家族控制着中国银行界的绝大部分；政治局常委、中国人民政协会议主席贾庆林是北京大宗地产开发的幕后利益所有者；胡锦涛的女婿运营着新浪网；温家宝的夫人控制着中国的宝石业。
5.一项最新发展有可能会使有关"既得利益"的传言更甚。美国境内与中国与关的网站本周报到说，一家与胡锦涛的长子胡海峰有关联的中国安保科技企业在纳米比亚受到贪污指控的调查。

一家马来西亚报纸7月19日的文章援引位于美国的异议人士网站报道说，胡海峰是案件"潜在的证人"，但他本人不是嫌疑犯。报道说，胡海峰是威视股份（Nuctech）的前总裁，现任该公司所属的清华同方公司党委书记。据加州大学伯克利分校的中国互联网项目、中国数字时代网站提供的信息，中宣部 7月21日下令封锁任何有关此案的报道。

6.XXX此前曾告知PolOff，领导人与强大的经济届人士有着紧密联系，尤其是房地产开发商以及企业领导人，他们中有些也有官员身份。

XXX说，在地方上也是如此。他声称，这些利益网对于政策有着影响，因为大多数地方官员是"买来了"他们的官职，希望能立刻为他们的投资获得"回报"。 XXX说，他们总是支持快速增长的政策，反对那些可能损害其利益的改革努力。他说，既得利益总是特别倾向于反对媒体的公开，以免土地转让的幕后交易受到质疑。XXX说，因此，与那些希望控制通货膨胀或者照顾弱势群体的人相比，"增长第一"的倡议者总会处于强势地位。

7.XXX表示，领导层政治的中心特征是，需要在离任后保护自己及家人。因此，现任领导人悉心培养门生，一旦自己下台，则有这些人来捍卫他们的利益。

XXX说，比如说像习近平这样一个保持不具威胁性和低调作风、从不树敌的人，会被江泽民和曾庆红提拔，这很正常。习近平会采取行动，确保江泽民不会受到骚扰，江泽民腐败的儿子不会被逮捕。
太子们与掌柜们

8.XXX描述中共高层的领导人序列很大程度上由个人的"太子"血统或"掌柜"经历决定。在最近数月的多次谈话中，XXX表示，有人认为中国的"太子" 们，即共产党内拥有显著地位的官员子女，包括许多建国元勋的后代，他们认为自己的前辈为共产主义革命流血，因此自己有"权利"继续领导中国，并保护那场革 命的成果。

XXX说，这样的思维方式会使这些"太子"们与那些没有类似家谱的党的成员，比如国家主席胡锦涛、总理温家宝以及团派背景的党员，构成潜在的冲突。后者被 带有嘲讽意味地称为"掌柜的儿子"。XXX听说，一些太子的家族抨击那些没有革命家史的人说："我父亲为中国流血牺牲的时候，你父亲还在卖鞋带呢。"
英文原文:

wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/07/09BEIJING2112.html
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 002112

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2034
TAGS: PGOV CH
SUBJECT: TOP LEADERSHIP DYNAMICS DRIVEN BY CONSENSUS,
INTERESTS, CONTACTS SAY

REF: A. BEIJING 2063
¶B. BEIJING 2040

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.
4 (b/d).

Summary
-------

¶1. (C) The need for consensus and the desire to protect
vested interests are the main drivers of Politburo Standing
Committee (PBSC) decision-making and Chinese leadership
dynamics in general, according to Embassy contacts with
access to leadership circles. Contacts have variously
described relations at the top of China's Party-state
structure as akin to those in the executive suite of a large
corporation, as determined by the interplay of powerful
interests, or as shaped by competition between "princelings"
with family ties to party elders and "shopkeepers" who have
risen through the ranks of the Party. End Summary.

Hu Jintao as Chairman of the Board?
-----------------------------------

¶2. (C) Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo
decision-making is similar to executive decision-making in a
large company, two well-connected contacts say. xxxxx that Party General
Secretary Hu Jintao could be compared to the Chairman of the
Board or CEO of a big corporation.xxxxx, used the
same analogy in a May 18 meeting with PolOffs. xxxxx said that
PBSC decision making was akin to a corporation in which the
greater the stock ownership the greater the voice in
decisions. "Hu Jintao holds the most stock, so his views
carry the greatest weight," and so on down the hierarchy, but
the PBSC did not formally vote, xxxxx. "It is a
consensus system," he maintained, "in which members can
exercise veto power."

¶3. (C) xxxxx had told PolOff previously that he knew "on very
good authority" that "major policies," such as the country's
core policy on Taiwan or North Korea, had to be decided by
the full 25-member Politburo. Other more specific matters,
he said, were decided by the nine-member PBSC alone. Some
issues were put to a formal vote, while others were merely
discussed until a consensus was reached. Either way, xxxxx
stated sarcastically, the Politburo was the "most democratic
body in the world," the only place in China where true
democracy existed. xxxxx said that although there was
"something" to the notion of a rough factional balancing at
the top between the Jiang Zemin-Shanghai group and the Hu-Wen
group, neither group was dominant, and major issues had to be
decided by consensus.

Leadership Dynamics: Driven by Vested Interests
--------------------------------------------- ---

¶4. (C)xxxxx asserted to PolOff March 12 that the Party should be
viewed primarily as a collection of interest groups. There
was no "reform wing," xxxxx claimed.xxxxx made the same
argument in several discussions with PolOff over the past
year, asserting that China's top leadership had carved up
China's economic "pie," creating an ossified system in which
"vested interests" drove decision-making and impeded reform
as leaders maneuvered to ensure that those interests were not
threatened. It was "well known," xxxxx stated, that former
Premier Li Peng and his family controlled all electric power
interests; PBSC member and security czar Zhou Yongkang and
associates controlled the oil interests; the late former top
leader Chen Yun's family controlled most of the PRC's banking
sector; PBSC member and Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference Chairman Jia Qinglin was the main
interest behind major Beijing real estate developments; Hu
Jintao's son-in -law ran Sina.com; and Wen Jiabao's wife
controlled China's precious gems sector.

¶5. (SBU) Note: In a development that could fan the "vested
interest" rumor mill, China-related websites in the United
States this week were reporting that a Chinese security
technology company with links to Hu's eldest son, Hu Haifeng,
was being investigated in Namibia on charges of corruption.
A July 19 article in a Malaysian paper, cited by a U.S.-based
dissident website, .com, reported that Hu Haifeng
was a "potential witness" in the case but was not himself a
suspect. The report said that the younger Hu was a former
CEO of Nuctech and currently the Party Secretary of its

Beijing 00002112 002 of 002


parent company, Tsinghua Holding Co. Ltd. According to the
China Digital Times website at the University of California
Berkeley's China Internet Project, the Central Propaganda
Department on July 21 issued orders to block any reference to
the case in the PRC media. End note.

¶6. (C) xxxxx, had told PolOff earlier that
leaders had close ties to powerful economic actors,
especially real estate developers and corporate leaders, who
in some cases were officials themselves. The same was true
at the local level, xxxxx stated. He claimed that these
interest networks had policy implications since most local
leaders had "bought" their positions and wanted an immediate
financial "return" on their investment. They always
supported fast-growth policies and opposed reform efforts
that might harm their interests, xxxxx. Vested
interests were especially inclined to oppose media openness,
he said, lest someone question the shady deals behind land
transactions. As a result, the proponents of "growth first"
would always be in a stronger position than those who favored
controlling inflation or taking care of the poor, xxxxx.

¶7. (C) xxxxx that the central feature of leadership
politics was the need to protect oneself and one's family
from attack after leaving office. Thus, current leaders
carefully cultivated proteges who would defend their
interests once they stepped down. It was natural, xxxxx said,
that someone like Xi Jinping, who maintained a
non-threatening low profile and had never made enemies, would
be elevated by Jiang Zemin and Zeng Qinghong. Xi would act
to ensure that Jiang was not harassed or that Jiang's corrupt
son would not be arrested, xxxxx.

Princelings vs. Shopkeepers
---------------------------

¶8. (C)xxxxx, separately
described leadership alignments at the top of the CCP as
shaped largely by one's "princeling" or "shopkeeper" lineage.
In separate conversations in recent months, xxxxx said that some argued that China's
"princelings," the sons and daughters of prominent Communist
Party officials, including many who helped found the PRC,
shared a perception that they, as the descendents of those
who shed blood in the name of the Communist revolution, had a
"right" to continue to lead China and protect the fruits of
that revolution. Such a mindset could potentially place the
"princelings" at odds with Party members who do not have
similar pedigrees, xxxxx, such as President
Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao and Party members with a CYL
background, who were derisively referred to as "shopkeepers'
sons." xxxxx had heard some princeling
families denounce those without revolutionary pedigrees by
saying, "While my father was bleeding and dying for China,
your father was selling shoelaces."
Goldberg