劉龍珠律師法律評論：徐曉東，武功再高、也怕菜刀，約架後果很嚴重

劉龍珠律師法律評論：徐曉東，武功再高、也怕菜刀，約架後果很嚴重

（附：英文法律評論）

文 / 劉龍珠律師

近日，自稱“太極拳宗師”的雷雷果然很雷，約架5個月，但卻在5秒之內被人KO，讓人大跌眼鏡。外行看熱鬧，內行看門道，而作為律師，當然看到的是擂台這種“約架”形式背後的法律問題。

一、為什麼要“約架”

99%都是爭風吃醋，約架是手段、約炮是目的。而剩下的1%雷大師這種，想忽悠別人，沒想到把自己忽悠進去了。

二、中國法律，“約架”是否算作“競技”？失手打死了人算誰的？

1、中國這方面的法律極其缺乏，除了有一部老掉牙的《體育法》（1995年頒發），就幾乎沒有對體育競技過程中，如果發生傷亡事件怎麼處理的法規了。

2、如果是正規的體育競技（比如拳擊比賽、散打比賽、武術對抗），假如在沒有過錯的情況下，是失手打死了人，那麼一般而言，勝方不需要承擔刑事責任，因為畢竟他既沒有過錯，也不是主觀惡意的去傷人。但是，民事責任是必須承擔的，比如死者老婆孩子的贍養費等等。

3、在正規的體育競技中（比如拳擊比賽、散打比賽、武術對抗），如果一方因為一定的過錯，失手打死了人，雖然他沒有主觀惡意去傷人，但因為自己行為不當，恐怕要承擔一部份的刑事責任。

比如，拳擊比賽中，一方已經倒地了，另一方還收不住架勢，衝上去補一拳頭，把人打傷、或打死，恐怕就要承擔“過失致人重傷罪”或“過失致人死亡罪”的刑事後果。

《中国刑法》

第二百三十三条　【过失致人死亡罪】过失致人死亡的，处三年以上七年以下有期徒刑；情节较轻的，处三年以下有期徒刑。本法另有规定的，依照规定。

第二百三十五条　【过失致人重伤罪】过失伤害他人致人重伤的，处三年以下有期徒刑或者拘役。本法另有规定的，依照规定。

三、中國“約架”合法嗎？

1、看情況。如果目的單純是為了體育切磋，且有合法、規範的競賽規則，不違反社會公序良俗，那麼應該不違法。所以，日前的所謂“太極宗師”雷大師5秒被KO一事，應該說來在中國是合法的。

2、黑社會約架是違法行為

如果兩個黑社會老大，打著“體育競技”的旗號，實際上是單挑、報仇、爭鬥地盤，那麼就觸犯了中國刑法第292和293條，即使沒有打出人命，也要承擔刑事責任。打出人命了刑事責任就更重。

第二百九十二条　【聚众斗殴罪；故意伤害罪；故意杀人罪】聚众斗殴的，对首要分子和其他积极参加的，处三年以下有期徒刑、拘役或者管制；有下列情形之一的，对首要分子和其他积极参加的，处三年以上十年以下有期徒刑：
　　（一）多次聚众斗殴的；
　　（二）聚众斗殴人数多，规模大，社会影响恶劣的；
　　（三）在公共场所或者交通要道聚众斗殴，造成社会秩序严重混乱的；
　　（四）持械聚众斗殴的。
　　聚众斗殴，致人重伤、死亡的，依照本法第二百三十四条、第二百三十二条的规定定罪处罚。

第二百九十三条　【寻衅滋事罪】有下列寻衅滋事行为之一，破坏社会秩序的，处五年以下有期徒刑、拘役或者管制：
　　（一）随意殴打他人，情节恶劣的；
　　（二）追逐、拦截、辱骂、恐吓他人，情节恶劣的；
　　（三）强拿硬要或者任意损毁、占用公私财物，情节严重的；
　　（四）在公共场所起哄闹事，造成公共场所秩序严重混乱的。
　　纠集他人多次实施前款行为，严重破坏社会秩序的，处五年以上十年以下有期徒刑，可以并处罚金。

四、在美國“約架”合法嗎？

美國的情況稍微複雜一些。一般說來，每個州有不同的法律，每個行業也有行業規則。如果是正式的拳擊協會、散打協會，按照嚴格的競技規則，組織拳擊比賽、散打比賽，那麼在美國是合法的，因為有競技規則對參賽者的人身安全予以保護。

如果沒有合法註冊的協會規則，比如“太極”對陣“散打”，美國人從來沒聽說過這種跨行業的撕逼，那麼肯定就會被警察認定為“Fight Club Participation”，成為非法活動了。檢察官檢控的罪名可以是：Assault（攻擊）, Battery（鬥毆）, Attractive Nuisance（引誘妨害，也就是導致兒童跟著學壞）, Endangerment（施加危害）, Unlicensed Business Enterprise（非法經營）等等。

所以在美國一定要注意，千萬不要發生“關公戰秦瓊”這樣的事情，因為沒有行業競技規則來保證“關公”和“秦瓊”的人身安全，所以檢察官會向關公和秦瓊提出刑事檢控，控告他們實施危險行為、聚眾鬥毆，且教壞小孩子。

五、加州怎麼定義約架的？

通常來說，約架要承擔刑事責任，但是如果在滿足特殊的情況下，約架從某種程度上可以免除刑事責任，只承擔打傷打殘的民事責任。

案例法People vs. Ross, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 438中，加州上訴法庭明確表示，“相互約架”（mutual combat）是雙方有意圖、且相互同意、有明確意思表示的鬥毆行為（mutual combat consists of fighting by mutual intention or consent, as most clearly reflected in an express or implied agreement to fight）。在這種情況下，約架不涉及刑事範疇。

FIGHTING IN DIFFERENT LEGAL CONTEXTS

By: Long Z. Liu, Esq.

COMBATIVE FIGHTING CIVIL LIABILITY

     For the purposes of this article, let us take fighting to be in context of civil battery. Under California Civil Jury Instructions (“CACI”) 1300, Battery is defined as: (1) touching, (2) of another person, (3) without consent, (4) that has caused harm or has offended the other person.  

     Moreover, for the purposes of this article let us take consent to be defined under California Civil Code 3515 that: “He who consents to an act is not wronged by it.” The California Supreme Court in Churchill v. Baumann, 95 Cal. 541, 545 has stood for the maxim that: “One who is not wronged has no cause of action and is not entitled to sue.”

     However, consent may be invalid under a number of grounds which will create a cause of action that entitles a person to sue. First, if the defendant has fraudulently obtained the plaintiff’s consent the consent may be invalidated. See Rains v. Superior Court, 150 Cal. App. 3d 933. Second, if the consent is conditional where the condition on which the consent is based does not occur, consent will be held invalid. Grieves v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. App. 3d 159. Third, consent cannot be obtained under duress, in such context, consent will be held invalid. Restatement of Torts section 892B. Fourth, consent may be invalidated if the battery exceeds the scope of the consent. Barbara A. v. Johnson G. 145 Cal.App. 3d 369, 375.

Therefore, in summary, whether a person has a cause of action for battery in the context of a mutually agreed challenge to fight will depend on the issue of “consent[1].”

FIGHTING IN CRIMINAL CONTEXT

     Whether a defendant will be liable for criminal battery in the context of a mutual physical combat will depend on whether there are facts supporting the doctrine of “mutual combat.”

     In People v. Ross, 66 Cal. Rptr.3d 438, the California Court of Appeal for the sixth district was satisfied with the definition that: “ “mutual combat” consists of fighting by mutual intention or consent, as most clearly reflected in an express or implied agreement to fight.” The court continued that, the agreement need not have all the legal characteristics of a binding contract. But there must be evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude that both combatants actually consented or intended to fight.

     Therefore, in summary, whether a person can be charged and convicted for criminal battery in the context of a mutually agreed upon combat will depend on whether there are facts to support the doctrine of “mutual combat.” And as discussed in the Ross case, mutual combat is like the civil defense of consent but may also include the element of intention.  

FIGHTING IN CONTEXT OF UFC

     Combatants who agree to fight in UFC promoted matches are required to sign a waiver of liability before fighting. This waiver, simply put, is an agreement. And the purpose of this agreement is to protect the UFC from any liability arising from the combat. The agreement will usually put forth facts related to the consequences of the sport MMA promoted by UFC.  In part, it usually states that: (1) MMA could get you hurt or killed, (2) you agree to engage into consensual combat with the opponent which you agree not to sue, and (3) you may not sue the UFC for harm caused during combat.

     The issue then becomes whether this agreement will be enforceable in court.

     In Cohen v. Five Brooks Stable, 159 Cal.App. 4th 1476, the court held that “a written release may exculpate a tortfeasor from future negligence or misconduct [but] to be effective, such a release ‘must be clear, unambiguous, and explicit in expressing the intent of the subscribing parties.” In the context of UFC, based on Cohen the court will engage into contractual interpretation where the decision on liability would depend on whether the contract is ambiguous in laying down the terms of consent. It would be an issue of fact.

     Therefore, in summary, whether a person and/or organization can be found liable in context of MMA fighting promoted by the UFC would depend on whether the written release is clear and unambiguous as far as the intent of the parties to engage in combat and consent to not sue.